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Divorce Laws and Divorce Rate in the U.S

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  • Stefania Marcassa

    () (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

At the end of the 1960s, the U.S. divorce law underwent major changes and the divorce rate almost doubled in all of the states. This paper shows that changes in property division, alimony transfers, and child custody assignments account for a substantial share of the increase in the divorce rate, especially for young, college educated couples with children. I solve and calibrate a model where agents make decisions on their marital status, savings, and labor supply. Under the new financial settlements, divorced men gain from a higher share of property, while women gain from an increase in alimony and child support transfers. The introduction of the unilateral decision to divorce has limited effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefania Marcassa, 2013. "Divorce Laws and Divorce Rate in the U.S," Post-Print hal-00865640, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00865640
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00865640
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Raquel Fernández & Joyce Cheng Wong, 2014. "Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes," NBER Working Papers 20251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Fernández, Raquel & Wong, Joyce Cheng, 2014. "Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 10047, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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