Visitations And Transfers In Non-Intact Househols
Recent research reveals that divorce negatively impacts children’s welfare as a consequence of the reduction in monetary and time contributions of the non-custodial parent. When the custody arrangement is sole custody, the variables that link the absent parent to the child are visitations and child support transfers. We explain visitations and child support transfers using a behavioral model of competitive equilibrium in which both variables are the results of competitive allocations realized in a decentralized non-cooperative manner. In our framework the mother has control over visitations and the father has control over child support. Estimates of the model are used to simulate the e"ects of alternative endowment levels on the proportion of time spent with the noncustodial parent and the ex-post parental income distribution. Our results show that a more equal allocation of time with the child, though beneficial to the children, may negatively a"ect the mother’s welfare, increasing the income gap between ex-spouses.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via Po 53 10124 Turin|
Web page: http://www.carloalberto.org/child-collegiocarloalberto/
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- H. Peters & Laura Argys & Eleanor Maccoby & Robert Mnookin, 1993. "Enforcing divorce settlements: Evidence from child support compliance and award modifications," Demography, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 719-735, November.
- Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 1994.
"Expenditure Decisions of Divorced Mothers and Income Composition,"
Journal of Human Resources,
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(3), pages 742-761.
- del Boca, D. & Flinn, C.J., 1992. "Expenditure Decisions of Divorced Mothers and Income Composition," Working Papers 92-40, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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