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Mothers, Fathers and Children after Divorce: The Role of Institutions

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  • Del Boca, Daniela

    () (University of Turin)

Abstract

In recent years the increase in the divorce rate in many advanced countries and the predominance of female-headed families among the poor has generated much interest in the relationship between divorce and the welfare of mothers and children. In this paper I will review a small body of economic literature which has been recently developed in order to analyze the economic consequence of divorce on the welfare of fathers, mothers and children under alternative behavioral assumptions. Important economic and econometric issues arise from an analysis of welfare in non intact households as compared with intact households. In particular the focus is on the role that institutions play in post-divorce arrangements and important implications concerning policies for child support, custody, and visitation.

Suggested Citation

  • Del Boca, Daniela, 2002. "Mothers, Fathers and Children after Divorce: The Role of Institutions," IZA Discussion Papers 428, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp428
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John F. Ermisch & Marco Francesconi, 2001. "Family structure and children's achievements," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 14(2), pages 249-270.
    2. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 1994. "Expenditure Decisions of Divorced Mothers and Income Composition," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 29(3), pages 742-761.
    3. Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher J, 1995. "Rationalizing Child-Support Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1241-1262, December.
    4. Flinn, Christopher J, 2000. "Modes of Interaction between Divorced Parents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(3), pages 545-578, August.
    5. Lazear, Edward P. & Michael, Robert T., 1988. "Allocation of Income within the Household," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226469669.
    6. Daniela Del Boca & Rocio Ribero, 2003. "Visitations and Transfers After Divorce," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 187-204, September.
    7. Yoram Weiss & Robert J. Willis, "undated". "An Economic Analysis of Divorce Settlements," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 89-5, Chicago - Population Research Center.
    8. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
    9. Blundell,R. W. & Preston,Ian & Walker,Ian (ed.), 1994. "The Measurement of Household Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521451956.
    10. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1993. "Transfers among Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 629-679, October.
    11. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1985. "Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 268-292, July.
    12. Del Boca, Daniela & Ribero, Rocio, 1998. "Transfers in non-intact households," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-478, December.
    13. Browning, Martin, 1992. "Children and Household Economic Behavior," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(3), pages 1434-1475, September.
    14. Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, 1985. "Economic Consequences of Marital Instability," NBER Chapters,in: Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty, and Economic Well-Being, pages 427-470 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0196 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Wolfgang Frimmel & Martin Halla & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2016. "How Does Parental Divorce Affect Children's Long-term Outcomes?," Working Papers 2016-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    3. Gianna Claudia Giannelli & Lucia Mangiavacchi, 2010. "Children's Schooling and Parental Migration: Empirical Evidence on the ‘Left‐behind’ Generation in Albania," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 24(s1), pages 76-92, December.
    4. Anna Klabunde & Evelyn Korn, 2010. "Parasites and Raven Mothers: A German-Japanese Comparison on (Lone) Motherhood," Ruhr Economic Papers 0196, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    5. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Nielsen & Francisco Pérez-González & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2005. "Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-13, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Sep 2005.
    6. Klabunde, Anna & Korn, Evelyn, 2010. "Parasites and Raven Mothers: A German-Japanese Comparison on (Lone) Motherhood," Ruhr Economic Papers 196, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Bennedsen, Morten & Nielsen, Kasper & Pérez-González, Francisco & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2005. "Inside the Family Firm," Working Papers 21-2005, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    8. Pierre-André Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 37-74.
    9. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Jean-Claude Ray, 2014. "Child support order: how do judges decide without guidelines? Evidence from France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, December.
    10. repec:bla:manchs:v:85:y:2017:i:3:p:320-338 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:spr:eurpop:v:33:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10680-017-9417-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Martin Halla, 2005. "Unterhalt, Obsorge und Scheidungsanwälte: Eine ökonometrische Untersuchung der einvernehmlichen Scheidung in Österreich," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 141(IV), pages 501-525, December.
    13. Geir Wæhler Gustavsen & Rodolfo M. Nayga & Ximing Wu, 2016. "Effects of Parental Divorce on Teenage Children’s Risk Behaviors: Incidence and Persistence," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 474-487, September.
    14. Anna Klabunde & Evelyn Korn, 2010. "Parasites and Raven Mothers: A German-Japanese comparison on (lone) motherhood," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201023, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    15. Maya Rossin-Slater & Miriam Wüst, 2016. "Parental Responses to Child Support Obligations: Evidence from Administrative Data," NBER Working Papers 22227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Bruno Jeandidier & Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban, 2009. "Economie du droit du divorce," Post-Print halshs-00521353, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    intra-household allocation; children welfare; Divorce;

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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