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Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support

Author

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  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Yoram Weiss

Abstract

There is some evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families but that this gap declines with the aggregate divorce rate. We develop a model in which the higher expectations for remarriage associated with higher divorce rates can trigger an equilibrium in which divorced fathers make more generous transfers that benefit their children and the mother in the aftermath of divorce. As a result, the welfare loss of children from the separation of their parents can be lower when divorce and remarriage rates rise.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 37-74.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:25:y:2007:p:37-74
    DOI: 10.1086/508731
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Moshe HAZAN & Hosny ZOABI, 2015. "Sons or Daughters? Sex Preferences and the Reversal of the Gender Educational Gap," JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(2), pages 179-201, June.
    2. Mikhail Freer & Khushboo Surana, 2021. "Stable marriage in the eyes of the law," Papers 2110.10781, arXiv.org.
    3. Nicholas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2011. "Marriage with Labor Supply," 2011 Meeting Papers 446, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Nguyen Thang Dao & Julio Dávila & Angela Greulich, 2021. "The education gender gap and the demographic transition in developing countries," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 34(2), pages 431-474, April.
    5. Chakravorty, Swastika & Goli, Srinivas, 2021. "Family Structure, Economic Outcomes and Perceived Change in Economic Well-being in India," OSF Preprints 23kvs, Center for Open Science.
    6. Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2011. "Marriage with Labor Supply," Post-Print halshs-00639313, HAL.
    7. Alessandro Cigno, 2012. "Marriage as a commitment device," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 193-213, June.
    8. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2009. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1689-1713, December.
    9. Alessandro Cigno & Mizuki Komura & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 805-834, July.
    10. Victor Hiller & Magali Recoules, 2010. "Divorce decisions, divorce laws and social norms," Post-Print halshs-00497439, HAL.
    11. Molina, José Alberto & Gimenez-Nadal, J. Ignacio & Velilla, Jorge, 2018. "Intra-Household Wealth and Welfare Inequality in the US: Estimations from a Collective Model of Labor Supply," IZA Discussion Papers 11707, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Hiller, Victor & Recoules, Magali, 2013. "Changes in divorce patterns: Culture and the law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 77-87.
    13. Ivan Vidangos & Joseph Altonji, 2014. "Marriage Dynamics, Earnings Dynamics, and Lifetime Family Income," 2014 Meeting Papers 1230, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2007. "Public Goods, Transferable Utility and Divorce Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 2646, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Francesconi, Marco & Rainer, Helmut & van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2008. "Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform: The Case of Divorced Parents," IZA Discussion Papers 3891, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Erin Fletcher, 2016. "Match quality and maternal investments in children," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-102, March.
    17. Pierre–André Chiappori & Natalia Radchenko & Bernard Salanié, 2018. "Divorce and the duality of marital payoff," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 833-858, September.
    18. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," IZA Discussion Papers 3892, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09j00420pk7 is not listed on IDEAS

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