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Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts

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  • Daniela Del Boca

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  • Christopher J. Flinn

    ()

Abstract

We develop a simple model of household time allocation decisions under strong functional form assumptions regarding preferences and household production technology. We argue that the specification is general when allowing for unrestrictive forms of population heterogeneity in the parameters characterizing these functions. Moreover, we argue that the model is not capable of distinguishing among elements of a class of behavioral rules, including Nash bargaining and Nash equilibrium, without restricting population heterogeneity in arbitrary ways. However, preferences over mates for any given set of male and female characteristics will be a function of the behavioral rules used in married households. Using data from the PSID on market hours and time spent in household production, we estimate the marginal distribution of male and female characteristics and our two alternative behavioral assumptions, and perform some formal and informal comparisons of the Nash bargaining and Nash equilibrium rules’ ability to predict the marital sorts observed in the data. Given the simplicity of the model of household behavior and marriage market equilibrium, it is perhaps not surprising that neither model provides good predictions. Overall, the evidence is slightly more supportive of the hypothesis that households behave noncooperatively.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 2005. "Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts," CHILD Working Papers wp15_05, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp15_05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "Marriage matching, risk sharing and spousal labor supplies," Working Papers tecipa-332, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde & Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, 2011. "From Shame to Game in One Hundred Years: A Macroeconomic Model of the Rise in Premarital Sex and its De-Stigmatization," RCER Working Papers 569, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    3. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, 2016. "Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment, and Married Female Labor-Force Participation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 1-41, January.
    4. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, 2014. "From Shame To Game In One Hundred Years: An Economic Model Of The Rise In Premarital Sex And Its De-Stigmatization," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 25-61, February.
    5. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castillo , 2006. "Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-111, June.
    6. Leonardo Felli & Leeat Yariv & Allan Collard-Wexler & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2010. "Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption," 2010 Meeting Papers 273, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Goussé, Marion & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Robin, Jean-Marc, 2017. "Household labour supply and the marriage market in the UK, 1991-2008," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 131-149.
    8. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    9. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2013. "Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 701-720, September.
    10. Soohyung Lee, 2008. "Preferences and Choice Constraints in Marital Sorting: Evidence From Korea," Discussion Papers 07-042, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    11. Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2016. "Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production: A Longitudinal Microeconomic Analysis of Marriage, Intra-Household Bargaining and Time Use Using the BHPS, 1991-2008," Cahiers de recherche 1601, CIRPEE.
    12. Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2011. "Marriage with Labor Supply," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01073728, HAL.
    13. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00639313 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Allan Collard-Wexler & Leonardo Felli & Leeat Yariv, 2014. "Child-Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 133-158, July.
    15. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2009. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1689-1713, December.
    16. Steve Laufer & Ahu Gemici, 2009. "Marriage and Cohabitation," 2009 Meeting Papers 1191, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Jeremy Greenwood, 2011. "Technology And The Changing Family," 2011 Meeting Papers 1420, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    18. Bruze, Gustaf, 2010. "Male and Female Marriage Returns to Schooling," Working Papers 10-17, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    19. Iyigun, Murat, 2009. "Marriage, Cohabitation and Commitment," IZA Discussion Papers 4341, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    20. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Working Papers tecipa-340, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    21. Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2017. "Household Labour Supply and the Marriage Market in the UK, 1991-2008," Post-Print halshs-01476509, HAL.
    22. Ekaterina Selezneva, 2010. "What makes Russian women (un)happy? A closer look at the family," Working Papers 287, Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies).
    23. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09j00420pk7 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bilateral Matching; Household Time Allocation; Nash Bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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