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Unterhalt, Obsorge und Scheidungsanwälte: Eine ökonometrische Untersuchung der einvernehmlichen Scheidung in Österreich

Im Jahr 2003 wurden 88,4% aller Scheidungen in Österreich im Einvernehmen geschieden. Die einvernehmliche Scheidung erfordert--wenn beide Gatten die Scheidung wünschen--nur eine Vereinbarung der wesentlichen Scheidungsfolgen. Anhand von Scheidungsakten der Jahre 1997 bis 2003 eines österreichischen Bezirksgerichtes werden diese Scheidungsvereinbarungen analysiert. Der Ehegatten- und der Kindesunterhalt werden simultan geschätzt. Es zeigt sich unter anderem, dass Männer ihre Ex-Frauen für beziehungsspezifische Investitionen kompensieren. Frauen sind bereit, auf Ressourcen zu verzichten, um die Kinder in ihrem Haushalt erziehen zu können. Sie ziehen jedoch die Vereinbarung einer Obsorge beider Teile der alleinigen Obsorge vor, um nicht die gesamte Erziehungsverantwortung tragen zu müssen. Eine rechtliche Vertretung führt tendenziell zu höheren Unterhaltszahlungen für Frau und Kind.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria in its series Economics working papers with number 2004-10.

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Date of creation: Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:jku:econwp:2004_10
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