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Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing

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  • Martin Halla
  • Johann Scharler

Abstract

In this paper we study the importance of marriage for interstate risk sharing. We find that US states in which married couples account for a higher share of the population are less exposed to state-specific output shocks. Thus, marriages do not just improve the allocation of risk at the individual level, but also have implications for the allocation of risk at the more aggregated state-level. Quantitatively, the impact of marriage on interstate risk sharing varies over divorce regimes.

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Paper provided by The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria in its series NRN working papers with number 2008-03.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jku:nrnwps:2008_03
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Phone: +43-732-2468-8216
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Keywords: Risk sharing; marriage; divorce; family law;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
  • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
  • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
  • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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Cited by:

  1. Olivier Donni, 2012. "Overinvestment in Marriage-Specific Capital," THEMA Working Papers 2012-29, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Tammi, Timo, 2013. "Dictator game giving and norms of redistribution: Does giving in the dictator game parallel with the supporting of income redistribution in the field?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 44-48.

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