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Would you civil union me? Civil unions and taxes in France: Did the reform of income taxation raise the rate of civil unions?

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  • Marion Leturcq

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This paper looks whether the choice to contract a civil union is motivated by fiscal reasons. Since 1999, in France, different-sex couples can contract either a marriage or a civil union, called a pacs. It is a new legal form of union, more flexible than marriage. The pacs turned to be successful, 30% of new unions in 2007 were pacs. In 2005, the income taxation of pacsed partners changed to benefit more to pacsed couples. This paper investigates the link between the reform of the income taxation and the growing number of pacs by analyzing the impact that should be observed if couples answer was the optimal one. It shows that about 38% of the newly contracted pacs since 2005 can be attributed to the reform. This tends to show that the choice to contract a pacs is determined by short-term views. Then it questions the link between marriage and civil union, the pacs could be either thought as a substitute or a complementary to the marriage.

Suggested Citation

  • Marion Leturcq, 2009. "Would you civil union me? Civil unions and taxes in France: Did the reform of income taxation raise the rate of civil unions?," Working Papers halshs-00566846, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00566846
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00566846
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    Cited by:

    1. Adamopoulou, Effrosyni, 2012. "Peer Effects in Young Adults' Marital Decisions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1228, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    civil union; marriage; income taxation; incentive effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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