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The economics of marriage

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  • Alessandro Cigno

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Abstract

In a separate-property jurisdiction, marriage may induce domestic cooperation, and enhance efficiency in the production of children, because it may lend credibility to the prospective main earner's promise to compensate the main childcarer when the children will no longer be economically dependent on them. In a community-property jurisdiction, marriage will induce domestic cooperation, and enhance efficiency in the production of children, because it rules out strategic behaviour. Whatever the matrimonial property regime, reducing the cost or difficulty of obtaining a divorce will have no permanent effect on the divorce rate. In a separate-property jurisdiction, it will encourage marriage, and induce more married women to specialize in market work. Couples should be allowed to choose the matrimonial property regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Cigno, 2011. "The economics of marriage," CHILD Working Papers wp02_11, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp02_11
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    File URL: http://www.child.carloalberto.org/images/wp/child02_2011.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Fort, Margherita, 2005. "Education and timing of births: evidence from a natural experiment in Italy," ISER Working Paper Series 2005-20, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    2. Alessandro Cigno, 2006. "A constitutional theory of the family," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 259-283, June.
    3. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Pierre Pestieau, 2008. "Pensions with heterogenous individuals and endogenous fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 21(4), pages 961-981, October.
    4. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1335-1357, July.
    5. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1997. "The Value of Children and Immigrants in a Pay-As-You-Go Pension System: A Proposal for a Partial Transition to a Funded System," NBER Working Papers 6229, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2005. "The Role of Family Ties in the Labour Market. An Interpretation Based on Efficiency Wage Theory," MPRA Paper 8956, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Francavilla, Francesca & Giannelli, Gianna Claudia & Grilli, Leonardo, 2008. "School Attendance of Children and the Work of Mothers: A Joint Multilevel Model for India," IZA Discussion Papers 3531, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1335-1357, July.
    9. Gianna Claudia Giannelli & Francesca Francavilla, 2007. "The Relation between Child Labour and Mothers’ Work: The Case of India," CHILD Working Papers wp22_07, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    divorce; alimony; matrimonial property; commitment; fertility; domestic division of labour;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • K30 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - General

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