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Will you civil union me? Taxation and civil unions in France

Author

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  • LETURCQ, Marion

Abstract

Although the tax system is not marriage neutral in many countries, it has been found only slightly significant in determining marriage decision (Buffeteau and Echevin, 2003; Alm and Whittington, 1995). This paper tests if the tax system could alter the decision to contract a civil union, which is a less binding marital contract. In France, since 1999, couples can either contract a marriage or a civil union (pacs). I assess the impact of taxation on the decision to contract a pacs using a difference-in-differences evaluation of the 2005 reform of income taxation of newly pacsed couples. As the control group is contaminated by the reform, I propose an original estimation method based on a difference-in-differences-in-differences setting to estimate bounds to the impact of the reform. My results suggest a positive and increasing impact of taxation on pacs rates, but also a change in the timing of pacs indicating that taxation alters the decision to contract a pacs. I find a slightly significant impact of taxation on the decision to break up a pacs.
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Suggested Citation

  • LETURCQ, Marion, 2012. "Will you civil union me? Taxation and civil unions in France," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2445, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2445
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.02.008
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economics, 96(5-6), 541-552, 2012
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    Cited by:

    1. Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2023. "Gender wage and longevity gaps and the design of retirement systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 263-287.
    2. Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth & Roeder, Kerstin, 2019. "Till taxes do us part: Tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 37-50.
    3. Fabio Blasutto & Egor Kozlov, 2020. "(Changing) Marriage and Cohabitation Patterns in the US: do Divorce Laws Matter?," 2020 Papers pbl245, Job Market Papers.
    4. Adamopoulou, Effrosyni, 2012. "Peer Effects in Young Adults' Marital Decisions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1228, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Andrew E. Clark & Conchita D’Ambrosio & Anthony Lepinteur, 2023. "Marriage as insurance: job protection and job insecurity in France," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 1157-1190, December.
    6. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," Working Papers hal-02365239, HAL.
    7. Guillaume Allegre & Hélène Périvier & Muriel Pucci, 2019. "Imposition des couples en France et statut marital : simulation de trois réformes du quotient conjugal," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2019-05, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    8. Ho Lun Wong, 2021. "Effect of marriage registration on fertility and intrahousehold distribution in Thailand," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 312-338, August.
    9. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1u4nmlgre68gopcegtmgm6cb5s is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Leturcq, Marion, 2012. "Will you civil union me? Taxation and civil unions in France," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 541-552.
    11. Cremer, Helmuth & Barigozzi, Francesca & Roeder, Kerstin, 2017. "Until taxes do us part: tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision," CEPR Discussion Papers 12396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Goussé, Marion & Leturcq, Marion, 2022. "More or less unmarried. The impact of legal settings of cohabitation on labour market outcomes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    13. Guillaume Allegre & Hélène Périvier & Muriel Pucci Porte, 2019. "Imposition des couples en France et statut marital : simulation de trois réformes du quotient familial," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-03403189, HAL.
    14. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," TEPP Working Paper 2019-05, TEPP.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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