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Until Taxes Do Us Part: Tax Penalties or Bonuses and the Marriage Decision

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  • Francesca Barigozzi
  • Helmuth Cremer
  • Kerstin Roeder

Abstract

The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and Germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage proposal game. At the end of the game they may get married, live together without formal marriage, or split up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property we obtain is that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married. If the bonus is sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains. Similarly, a marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability. Specifically, the penalty may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which was otherwise not possible. Our results also imply that marriage decisions in the laissez-faire are not necessarily privately optimal. In some cases a bonus or a penalty may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient; it may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Barigozzi & Helmuth Cremer & Kerstin Roeder, 2017. "Until Taxes Do Us Part: Tax Penalties or Bonuses and the Marriage Decision," CESifo Working Paper Series 6740, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6740
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leturcq, Marion, 2012. "Will you civil union me? Taxation and civil unions in France," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 541-552.
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    5. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, 2005. "Income Taxation and Marital Decisions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(3), pages 565-599, Juky.
    6. De Fraja, Gianni, 2009. "The origin of utility: Sexual selection and conspicuous consumption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 51-69, October.
    7. Apps,Patricia & Rees,Ray, 2009. "Public Economics and the Household," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521716284, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage penalty; marriage bonus; proposal game; signaling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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