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Household bargaining, spouses’ consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes

Author

Listed:
  • Helmuth Cremer
  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur
  • Kerstin Roeder

Abstract

We study optimal commodity taxes under household bargaining. We focus on the taxation of ‘female’ and ‘male’ products. The expressions for the tax rates include Pigouvian and incentive terms. When the female spouse has the lower bargaining weight, the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidization of the ‘female good’, and a taxation of the ‘male good’. The incentive term depends on the distribution of bargaining weights across couples. When the bargaining weight of the female spouse increases with wages, the female good will be consumed in larger proportion by more productive couples. In this case the Pigouvian term is mitigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmuth Cremer & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Kerstin Roeder, 2021. "Household bargaining, spouses’ consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 225-247.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:73:y:2021:i:1:p:225-247.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpz060
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    Cited by:

    1. Komura, Mizuki & Ogawa, Hikaru & Ogawa, Yoshitomo, 2019. "Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 384-393.
    2. Takuya Obara & Yoshitomo Ogawa, 2020. "Optimal Taxation in an Endogenous Fertility Model with Non-Cooperative Couples," Discussion Paper Series 211, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jan 2021.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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