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Will you civil union me? Taxation and civil unions in France

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  • Leturcq, Marion

Abstract

Although the tax system is not marriage neutral in many countries, it has been found to be only slightly significant in determining marriage decisions (Buffeteau and Echevin, 2003; Alm and Whittington, 1995). This paper tests whether the tax system can alter the decision to contract a civil union, which is less binding than a marital contract. In 1999, France introduced civil union (pacs) as an alternative legal union to marriage. I assess the impact of taxation on the decision to contract a pacs using a difference-in-differences evaluation of the 2005 income tax reform for newly pacsed couples. As the control group is contaminated by the reform, I propose an original estimation method based on a difference-in-differences-in-differences setting to estimate bounds to the impact of the reform. My results find a positive and increasing impact of taxation on pacs rates, but also a change in the timing of pacs unions suggesting that taxation alters the decision to contract a pacs. In addition, I find a slightly significant impact of taxation on the decision to terminate a pacs.

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  • Leturcq, Marion, 2012. "Will you civil union me? Taxation and civil unions in France," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 541-552.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:5:p:541-552
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.02.008
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew E. Clark & Conchita D’Ambrosio & Anthony Lepinteur, 2023. "Marriage as insurance: job protection and job insecurity in France," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 1157-1190, December.
    2. Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2023. "Gender wage and longevity gaps and the design of retirement systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 263-287.
    3. Guillaume Allegre & Hélène Périvier & Muriel Pucci, 2019. "Imposition des couples en France et statut marital : simulation de trois réformes du quotient conjugal," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2019-05, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    4. Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth & Roeder, Kerstin, 2019. "Till taxes do us part: Tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 37-50.
    5. Leturcq, Marion, 2012. "Will you civil union me? Taxation and civil unions in France," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 541-552.
    6. Adamopoulou, Effrosyni, 2012. "Peer Effects in Young Adults' Marital Decisions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1228, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1u4nmlgre68gopcegtmgm6cb5s is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," Working Papers hal-02365239, HAL.
    9. Ho Lun Wong, 2021. "Effect of marriage registration on fertility and intrahousehold distribution in Thailand," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 312-338, August.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1lc919l7sm8pt87iaubt8n43lo is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Guillaume Allegre & Hélène Périvier & Muriel Pucci Porte, 2019. "Imposition des couples en France et statut marital : simulation de trois réformes du quotient familial," Working Papers hal-03403189, HAL.
    12. Cremer, Helmuth & Barigozzi, Francesca & Roeder, Kerstin, 2017. "Until taxes do us part: tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision," CEPR Discussion Papers 12396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Goussé, Marion & Leturcq, Marion, 2022. "More or less unmarried. The impact of legal settings of cohabitation on labour market outcomes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    14. Olivier Bargain & Damien Echevin & Nicolas Moreau & Adrien Pacifico, 2019. "Inefficient Couples: Non-minimization of the Tax Burden among French Cohabiting Couples," TEPP Working Paper 2019-05, TEPP.
    15. Fabio Blasutto & Egor Kozlov, 2020. "(Changing) Marriage and Cohabitation Patterns in the US: do Divorce Laws Matter?," 2020 Papers pbl245, Job Market Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Civil union; Taxation; Marriage; Pacs; Difference in difference;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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