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On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

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  • Éric Langlais

Abstract

In this paper, the unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and alternative compensation rules benefiting to the parent having custody of the children. Their influence are studied both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage contracting; particularly when consideration of parents’ altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases. JEL Classification: D1-K10-K12-K41-J12

Suggested Citation

  • Éric Langlais, 2010. "On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(3), pages 229-256.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_763_0229
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefania Marcassa, 2011. "Divorce Laws and Divorce Rate in the U.S," Working Papers 2011-009, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    2. Fisher, H., 2011. "Divorce Property Division and the Decision to Marry or Cohabit," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1101, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage models; unilateral divorce law; the parents' altruism and protective measures for children;

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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