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Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law

Author

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  • Bruno Deffains

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eric Langlais

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, we study how the uncertainty in the behavior of judges provides parents going to separate with incentives to cooperate. We introduce a model of cooperative bargaining to describe the behavior of parents whose preferences satisfy the characterization of risk averse/pessimistic types proposed by Yaari (1987, Econometrica, 55, 95–116) in his Dual Decision Theory under Risk. The behavior of the judge is modeled in a simple manner: he is either supposed to follow a strict rule (we will say that he uses an imperative scale of alimony), or he may use discretion (he uses an indicative scale of alimony). The point is that for both parents the judgment represents an external opportunity to divorce—the disagreement point in negotiation. We show that the effective decision of parents (cooperation versus trial) depends on the specific structure of the costs and risks associated with divorce procedures, such that more uncertainty at trial increases the incentives to cooperate for risk averse parents. Finally, we give a characterization of the optimal degree of the judges' discretionary power required to maximize the parents' gains from negotiation.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2006. "Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law," Post-Print hal-00279184, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279184
    DOI: 10.1007/s11150-006-0009-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cigno, A., 2016. "Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-660, Elsevier.
    2. Éric Langlais, 2010. "On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(3), pages 229-256.
    3. Alessandro Cigno, 2012. "Marriage as a commitment device," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 193-213, June.
    4. Brigitte Pereira, 2023. "Guidelines, court decisions and dismissals [Barèmes d’indemnisation, décisions de justice et licenciement]," Post-Print hal-04190156, HAL.
    5. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Bruno Jeandidier, 2021. "Guidelines: Decision-Making Tools for Litigantsand Judges [Les barèmes, outils d’aide à la décision pour les justiciables et les juges]," Post-Print hal-03054417, HAL.
    6. Alessandro Cigno, 2014. "Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 60(3), pages 599-612.

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