IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/hapoch/v1_609.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security

Author

Listed:
  • Cigno, A.

Abstract

The early contributions to the microeconomic literature assume that only market goods yield utility, and that the only way adults can secure the consumption of these goods in old age is by saving. The more recent contributions recognize, however, that the elderly derive utility also from goods without a perfect market substitute like the care and attention they might receive from their near and dear, and that the elderly may eventually become too old or infirm to keep control over their own money. According to a branch of the literature, parents negotiate the provision of personal services directly with their children. According to another, such negotiations are made unnecessary by self-enforcing family rules. Fertility, aging, care of the very young and care of the very old are inextricably related issues also at the aggregate level, because a society cannot collectively provide for its aged members by simply accumulating assets. It must also have enough working-age people to man the physical capital and materially take care of the elderly. The link between fertility- and aging-related questions is stronger in the presence of an underfunded public pension system, where current pensions are paid for by current workers. The chapter addresses all these questions and concludes with a discussion of second-best policy in the presence of informational asymmetries.

Suggested Citation

  • Cigno, A., 2016. "Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, Elsevier.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:hapoch:v1_609
    DOI: 10.1016/bs.hespa.2016.05.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212007616300013
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-1093, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Alessandro Cigno, 2011. "Agency in Family Policy: A Survey," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(2), pages 305-331, June.
    3. Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2006. "Incentives to cooperate and the discretionary power of courts in divorce law," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 423-439, December.
    4. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 533-542, 04/05.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
    6. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 1996. "Bequests as a Heir "Discipline Device."," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 9(4), pages 405-414, November.
    7. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    8. Cigno, Alessandro, 2006. "The political economy of intergenerational cooperation," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
    9. Alessandro Cigno, 2010. "How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 56(1), pages 21-37, March.
    10. Axel Börsch-Supan & Alexander Ludwig & Joachim Winter, 2006. "Ageing, Pension Reform and Capital Flows: A Multi-Country Simulation Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(292), pages 625-658, November.
    11. Liliana Pezzin & Robert Pollak & Barbara Schone, 2009. "Long-term care of the disabled elderly: do children increase caregiving by spouses?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 323-339, September.
    12. Donald Cox & Oded Stark, 2007. "On the Demand for Grandchildren: Tied Transfers and the Demonstration Effect," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Happiness, chapter 18 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Martin Kolmar, 1997. "Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 10(3), pages 335-356.
    14. Entwisle, Barbara & Winegarden, C R, 1984. "Fertility and Pension Programs in LDCs: A Model of Mutual Reinforcement," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 331-354, January.
    15. Helmuth Cremer & Kerstin Roeder, 2017. "Rotten spouses, family transfers, and public goods," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 141-161, January.
    16. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503.
    17. Modigliani, Franco, 1986. "Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 297-313, June.
    18. Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1165-1177, May.
    19. Breyer, Friedrich, 1994. "The political economy of intergenerational redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 61-84, May.
    20. Alessandro Cigno, 2006. "A constitutional theory of the family," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 259-283, June.
    21. de la Croix, David & Pierrard, Olivier & Sneessens, Henri R., 2013. "Aging and pensions in general equilibrium: Labor market imperfections matter," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 104-124.
    22. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1992. "Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1177-1198, December.
    23. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    24. Esteban Joan Maria & Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Intertemporal Transfer Institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 189-205, December.
    25. Baland, Jean-Marie & Robinson, James A., 2002. "Rotten parents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 341-356, June.
      • Baland, J.M. & Robinson, J.A., 1998. "Rotten Parents," Papers 207, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
    26. Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
    27. de la Croix, David & Pierrard, Olivier & Sneessens, Henri R., 2013. "Aging and pensions in general equilibrium: Labor market imperfections matter," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 104-124.
    28. Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2009. "Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 80-106, May.
    29. Bernheim, B Douglas & Bagwell, Kyle, 1988. "Is Everything Neutral?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 308-338, April.
    30. Antonio Rangel, 1999. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange," Working Papers 00001, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    31. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-165.
    32. Jie Zhang & Junsen Zhang, 2004. "How does social security affect economic growth? Evidence from cross-country data," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 17(3), pages 473-500, August.
    33. Barro, Robert J & Becker, Gary S, 1989. "Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 481-501, March.
    34. Gullason, Edward T & Kolluri, Bharat R & Panik, Michael J, 1993. "Social Security and Household Wealth Accumulation: Refined Microeconometric Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(3), pages 548-551, August.
    35. Vincenzo Galasso & Roberta Gatti & Paola Profeta, 2009. "Investing for the old age: pensions, children and savings," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(4), pages 538-559, August.
    36. Nishimura, Kazuo & Zhang, Junsen, 1992. "Pay-as-you-go public pensions with endogenous fertility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 239-258, July.
    37. Alessandro Cigno & Mizuki Komura & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 805-834, July.
    38. Caillaud, B. & Cohen, D., 2000. "Inter-generational transfers and common values in a society," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1091-1103, May.
    39. Cigno, Alessandro & Rosati, Furio C., 1996. "Jointly determined saving and fertility behaviour: Theory, and estimates for Germany, Italy, UK and USA," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1561-1589, November.
    40. Neher, Philip A, 1971. "Peasants, Procreation, and Pensions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 380-389, June.
    41. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 151-182, July.
    42. Charles Hohm, 1975. "Social security and fertility: An international perspective," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 12(4), pages 629-644, November.
    43. Alessandro Cigno & Gianna Giannelli & Furio Rosati & Daniela Vuri, 2006. "Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 183-204, September.
    44. Antonio Rangel, 2003. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 813-834, June.
    45. Cigno, Alessandro, 2008. "Is there a social security tax wedge," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 68-77, February.
    46. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 2007. "The American Family and Family Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 3-26, Spring.
    47. Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo, 2015. "Endogenous division rules as a family constitution: strategic altruistic transfers and sibling competition," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 173-194, January.
    48. Pierre Pestieau & Motohiro Sato, 2006. "Long term care: the state and the family," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 83-84, pages 151-166.
    49. Koichi Miyazaki, 2013. "Pay-as-you-go social security and endogenous fertility in a neoclassical growth model," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 1233-1250, July.
    50. Guttman, Joel M., 2001. "Self-enforcing reciprocity norms and intergenerational transfers: theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 117-151, July.
    51. Maurizio Mazzocco, 2007. "Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 857-895.
    52. repec:adr:anecst:y:2006:i:83-84 is not listed on IDEAS
    53. Robert Fenge & Pierre Pestieau, 2005. "Social Security and Early Retirement," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262062496, January.
    54. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2013. "Fertility-related pensions and cyclical instability," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 1209-1232, July.
    55. Rosati, Furio Camillo, 1996. "Social security in a non-altruistic model with uncertainty and endogenous fertility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 283-294, May.
    56. Giam Cipriani, 2014. "Population aging and PAYG pensions in the OLG model," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 251-256, January.
    57. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2011. "Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard when the Quantity and Quality of Children are Stochastic," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(2), pages 349-364, June.
    58. Eckstein, Zvi & Wolpin, Kenneth I., 1985. "Endogenous fertility and optimal population size," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 93-106, June.
    59. Cigno, Alessandro & Rosati, Furio Camillo, 1992. "The Effects of Financial Markets and Social Security on Saving and Fertility Behaviour in Italy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 5(4), pages 319-341.
    60. Evans, Robert & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 361-369, December.
    61. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
    62. Liliana E. Pezzin & Robert A. Pollak & Barbara S. Schone, 2007. "Efficiency in Family Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and Disabled Elderly Parents," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 53(1), pages 69-96, March.
    63. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1121-1166, December.
    64. Alessandro Cigno, 2014. "Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 60(3), pages 599-612.
    65. Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, 1988. "A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25.
    66. Peters, Wolfgang, 1995. "Public Pensions, Family Allowances and Endogenous Demographic Change," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 161-183, May.
    67. Zhang, Jie, 1995. "Social security and endogenous growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 185-213, October.
    68. Cox, Donald, 1987. "Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 508-546, June.
    69. Alessandro Cigno & Martin Werding, 2007. "Children and Pensions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033690, January.
    70. Attanasio, Orazio & Kitao, Sagiri & Violante, Giovanni L., 2007. "Global demographic trends and social security reform," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 144-198, January.
    71. Diamond, P. A., 1977. "A framework for social security analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 275-298, December.
    72. David Lam, 1988. "Marriage Markets and Assortative Mating with Household Public Goods: Theoretical Results and Empirical Implications," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 23(4), pages 462-487.
    73. Stark, Oded, 1993. "Nonmarket transfers and altruism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 1413-1424, October.
    74. van Groezen, Bas & Leers, Theo & Meijdam, Lex, 2003. "Social security and endogenous fertility: pensions and child allowances as siamese twins," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 233-251, February.
    75. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
    76. Adrian Masters, 2008. "Marriage, Commitment and Divorce in a Matching Model with Differential Aging," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 614-628, July.
    77. David, Martin & Menchik, Paul L, 1985. "The Effect of Social Security on Lifetime Wealth Accumulation and Bequests," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 52(208), pages 421-434, November.
    78. Berthold U. Wigger, 1999. "Pay-as-you-go financed public pensions in a model of endogenous growth and fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 12(4), pages 625-640.
    79. Cigno, Alessandro & Camillio Rosati, Furio, 1997. "Rise and fall of the Japanese saving rate: The role of social security and intra-family transfers," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 81-92, March.
    80. Ehrlich, Isaac & Zhong, Jian-Guo, 1998. "Social Security and the Real Economy: An Inquiry into Some Neglected Issues," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 151-157, May.
    81. repec:aph:ajpbhl:1997:87:3:371-377_7 is not listed on IDEAS
    82. Murat Nick & P. Randall Walsh, 2007. "Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 507-535.
    83. Alessandro Cigno, 1998. "Fertility decisions when infant survival is endogenous," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 11(1), pages 21-28.
    84. repec:adr:anecst:y:2006:i:83-84:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
    85. Alessandro Cigno, 2012. "Marriage as a commitment device," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 193-213, June.
    86. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-1159, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Helmuth Cremer & Kerstin Roeder, 2017. "Rotten spouses, family transfers, and public goods," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 141-161, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private savings; Public pensions; Inter vivos transfers; Bequests; Care of the elderly; Family rules; Fertility; Longevity; Informational asymmetries; D7; D82; D91; H2; H31; H5; I2; J1;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hapoch:v1_609. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212007616300293 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.