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Optimal family policy in the presence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are stochastic

  • Alessandro Cigno

    ()

  • Annalisa Luporini

We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number, and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without taking into account the e¤ects of these actions on the government?s future tax revenue. The second-best policy provides parents with credit and insurance, and allows them to appropriate the external benefits of their actions.

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Paper provided by CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY in its series CHILD Working Papers with number wp13_09.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp13_09
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  1. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Endogenous Fertility And The Design Of Family Taxation," CHILD Working Papers wp03_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  2. CREMER, Helmuth & DELLIS, Arnaud & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Family size and optimal income taxation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1603, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Annalisa Luporini, 2006. "Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 235-243, 05.
  4. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Munich Reprints in Economics 938, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Tranfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," CHILD Working Papers wp02_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  6. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 55-87, 02.
  7. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2004. "Hidden information problems in the design of family allowances," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 645-655, December.
  8. Peters, Wolfgang, 1995. "Public Pensions, Family Allowances and Endogenous Demographic Change," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 161-83, May.
  9. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Munich Reprints in Economics 19606, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  10. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1995. "Population Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262181606, June.
  11. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November.
  12. Michel, Philippe & Pestieau, P, 1993. "Population Growth and Optimality: When Does Serendipity Hold?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 353-62, November.
  13. Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
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