IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp4179.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard, When the Quantity and Quality of Children Are Stochastic

Author

Listed:
  • Cigno, Alessandro

    () (University of Florence)

  • Luporini, Annalisa

    () (University of Florence)

Abstract

We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without taking into account the effects of these actions on the government's future tax revenue. The second-best policy provides parents with credit and insurance, and allows them to appropriate the external benefits of their actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa, 2009. "Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard, When the Quantity and Quality of Children Are Stochastic," IZA Discussion Papers 4179, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4179
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp4179.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel, Philippe & Pestieau, P, 1993. "Population Growth and Optimality: When Does Serendipity Hold?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 6(4), pages 353-362, November.
    2. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    3. Cigno, Alessandro, 2006. "The political economy of intergenerational cooperation," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
    4. Alessandro Cigno, 2010. "How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 56(1), pages 21-37, March.
    5. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1335-1357, July.
    6. Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 2002. "Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(2), pages 175-193, March.
    7. Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1165-1177, May.
    8. Annalisa Luporini, 2006. "Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 235-243, May.
    9. Helmuth Cremer & Arnaud Dellis & Pierre Pestieau, 2003. "Family size and optimal income taxation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 16(1), pages 37-54, February.
    10. Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
    11. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 55-87, February.
    12. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1995. "Population Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262181606, January.
    13. Peters, Wolfgang, 1995. "Public Pensions, Family Allowances and Endogenous Demographic Change," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 161-183, May.
    14. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2004. "Hidden information problems in the design of family allowances," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 17(4), pages 645-655, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gilles Le Garrec, 2015. "Increased longevity and social security reform: questioning the optimality of individual accounts when education matters," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 329-352, April.
    2. repec:eee:hapoch:v1_609 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Robert Fenge & Lisa Stadler, 2014. "Three Family Policies to Reconcile Fertility and Labor Supply," CESifo Working Paper Series 4922, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Pierre Pestieau & Gregory Ponthiere, 2013. "Childbearing Age, Family Allowances, and Social Security," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 385-413, October.
    5. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2015. "The Re-distributive Role of Child Benefits Revisited," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 476-501, June.
    6. Pierre Pestieau & Grégory Ponthière, 2011. "Childbearing Age, Family Allowances and Social Security," Working Papers hal-00612613, HAL.
    7. Cigno, A., 2016. "Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    scholarships; stochastic quantity and quality of children; population externalities; moral hazard; pensions; family allowances;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4179. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak). General contact details of provider: http://www.iza.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.