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Endogenous Fertility And The Design Of Family Taxation

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  • Alessandro Cigno

    ()

  • Annalisa Luporini

    ()

  • Anna Pettini

    ()

Abstract

The paper innovates on the existing optimal taxation literature by taking fertility as endogenous, and allowing for households to be di¤erentiated by ability to raise children, as well as wage rates. In a context where the government cannot observe personal abilities, fertility behaviour conveys a great deal of information about those characteristics, that helps relax the self-selection constraints on the design of policy. One of the results is that, in the absence of explicit inequality aversion, re-distribution should always be in favour of low-wage households, even if the latter happen to have higher laissez-faire utility than high-wage households. Another is that children should be a tax asset to their parents only if market and domestic skills are positively correlated. Even in that case, however, the optimal policy may include an unusual mix of taxes on the number of children, subsidies on child-speci…c commodities, income support for low-wage households, and positive marginal rates of income tax for all.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Endogenous Fertility And The Design Of Family Taxation," CHILD Working Papers wp03_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp03_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 2003. "Doing Wonders with an Egg: Optimal Re-distribution When Households Differ in Market and Non-Market Abilities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 479-498, July.
    4. Cigno, Alessandro & Pettini, Anna, 2002. "Taxing family size and subsidizing child-specific commodities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 75-90, April.
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    17. Dan Anderberg & Alessandro Balestrino, 2000. "Household Production and the Design of the Tax Structure," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(4), pages 563-584, August.
    18. Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 1999. "Direct and Indirect Taxation when Households Differ in Market and Non-market Abilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 181, CESifo Group Munich.
    19. Cigno, Alessandro, 1986. "Fertility and the Tax-Benefit System: A Reconsideration of the Theory of Family Taxation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(384), pages 1035-1051, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cigno, Alessandro, 2006. "The political economy of intergenerational cooperation," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
    2. Makoto Hirazawa & Akira Yakita, 2009. "Fertility, child care outside the home, and pay-as-you-go social security," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 565-583, July.
    3. Pierre Pestieau & Gregory Ponthiere, 2013. "Childbearing Age, Family Allowances, and Social Security," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 385-413, October.
    4. Thomas Baudin, 2011. "Family Policies: What Does the Standard Endogenous Fertility Model Tell Us?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 555-593, August.
    5. Kohei Daido & Ken Tabata, 2013. "Social Norms on Working Hours, Work-Life Balance, and Fertility Choice," Discussion Paper Series 108, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Sep 2013.
    6. Hippolyte D'Albis & Angela Greulich & Grégory Ponthière, 2015. "AVOIR UN ENFANT PLUS TARD Enjeux sociodémographiques du report des naissances," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01298929, HAL.
    7. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2011. "Optimal Family Policy in the Presence of Moral Hazard when the Quantity and Quality of Children are Stochastic," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(2), pages 349-364, June.
    8. Chen, Hung-Ju, 2013. "Child Allowances, Educational Subsidies and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 51279, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Alessandro Cigno, 2011. "Agency in Family Policy: A Survey," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(2), pages 305-331, June.
    10. Henrik Jordahl & Luca Micheletto, 2005. "Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal Equity," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(4), pages 681-708, October.
    11. Herwig Immervoll & David Barber, 2005. "Can Parents Afford to Work?: Childcare Costs, Tax-Benefit Policies and Work Incentives," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 31, OECD Publishing.
    12. Robert Fenge & Jakob Weizsäcker, 2010. "Mixing Bismarck and child pension systems: an optimum taxation approach," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 23(2), pages 805-823, March.
    13. Pierre Pestieau & Grégory Ponthière, 2011. "Childbearing Age, Family Allowances and Social Security," Working Papers hal-00612613, HAL.
    14. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 2001. "Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Public Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 409, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    15. Volker Meier & Matthias Wrede, 2013. "Reducing the excess burden of subsidizing the stork: joint taxation, individual taxation, and family tax splitting," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 1195-1207, July.
    16. George Smatrakalev, 2003. "Family taxation - pros and cons," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 2, pages 109-117.
    17. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00275751 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Alessandra Casarico & Luca Micheletto & Alessandro Sommacal, 2015. "Intergenerational transmission of skills during childhood and optimal public policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 353-372, April.
    19. Alessandro Balestrino, 2012. "Family Taxation, Fertility, and Horizontal Equity: A Political Economy Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 3774, CESifo Group Munich.
    20. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2015. "The Re-distributive Role of Child Benefits Revisited," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 476-501, June.
    21. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2006. "Optimal Policy Towards Families with Different Amounts of Social Capital, in the Presence of Asymmetric Information and Stochastic Fertility," CESifo Working Paper Series 1664, CESifo Group Munich.
    22. repec:hal:journl:hal-01298929 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Alessandro Cigno, 2001. "Comparative Advantage, Observability, and the Optimal Tax Treatment of Families with Children," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(4), pages 455-470, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal; direct; indirect; taxation; endogenous; fertility; children; self-selection; taxes;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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