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Optimal Policy Towards Families with Different Amounts of Social Capital, in the Presence of Asymmetric Information and Stochastic Fertility

  • Alessandro Cigno
  • Annalisa Luporini

We examine the effects of differences in social capital on first and second best transfers to families with children, in an asymmetric information context where the number of births, and the future earning capacity of each child that is born, are random variables. The probability that a couple has children is conditional on the level of reproductive activity undertaken. The probability that a child will have high earning ability is positively conditioned not only by the level of educational investment undertaken by the child’s parents, but also by the social capital of the latter. The optimal policy includes two transfers, one conditional on number of births, the other on the children’s earning ability.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2006/wp-cesifo-2006-02/cesifo1_wp1664.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1664.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1664
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  1. Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 2002. "Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 175-193, March.
  2. Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
  3. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Transfers to Families with Children as a Principal-Agent Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 351, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Annalisa Luporini, 2005. "Relative Performance Evaluation in a Multi-Plant Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 1420, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. CREMER, Helmuth & DELLIS, Arnaud & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2001. "Family size and optimal income taxation," CORE Discussion Papers 2001021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Hidden Information Problems in the Design of Family Allowances," IZA Discussion Papers 790, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Alessandro Cigno, 2005. "The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1632, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. CREMER, Helmuth & GAHVARI, Firouz & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1928, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Peters, Wolfgang, 1995. "Public Pensions, Family Allowances and Endogenous Demographic Change," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 161-83, May.
  10. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Munich Reprints in Economics 19606, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  11. Cigno, Alessandro & Pettini, Anna, 2002. "Taxing family size and subsidizing child-specific commodities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 75-90, April.
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