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Optimal Policy Towards Families with Di¤erent Amounts of Social Capital, in the Presence of Asymmetric Information and Stochastic Fertility

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  • Alessandro Cigno

    ()

  • Annalisa Luporini

    ()

Abstract

We examine the effects of di¤erences in social capital on first and second best transfers to families with children, in an asym- metric information context where the number of births, and the future earning capacity of each child that is born, are random variables. The probability that a couple has children is con- ditional on the level of reproductive activity undertaken. The probability that a child will have high earning ability is positively conditioned not only by the level of educational investment un- dertaken by the child's parents, but also by the social capital of the latter. The optimal policy includes two transfers, one con- ditional on number of births, the other on the children's earning ability.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2006. "Optimal Policy Towards Families with Di¤erent Amounts of Social Capital, in the Presence of Asymmetric Information and Stochastic Fertility," CHILD Working Papers wp03_06, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp03_06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cigno, Alessandro, 2006. "The political economy of intergenerational cooperation," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1335-1357, July.
    3. Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 2002. "Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(2), pages 175-193, March.
    4. Cigno, Alessandro & Pettini, Anna, 2002. "Taxing family size and subsidizing child-specific commodities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 75-90, April.
    5. Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1165-1177, May.
    6. Annalisa Luporini, 2006. "Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 235-243, May.
    7. Helmuth Cremer & Arnaud Dellis & Pierre Pestieau, 2003. "Family size and optimal income taxation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 16(1), pages 37-54, February.
    8. Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
    9. Peters, Wolfgang, 1995. "Public Pensions, Family Allowances and Endogenous Demographic Change," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 161-183, May.
    10. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2004. "Hidden information problems in the design of family allowances," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 17(4), pages 645-655, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meier, Volker & Wrede, Matthias, 2010. "Pensions, fertility, and education," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(01), pages 75-93, January.
    2. Robert Fenge & Volker Meier, 2005. "Pensions and fertility incentives," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 28-48, February.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/179 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Robert Fenge & Volker Meier, 2004. "Are Family Allowances and Fertility-related pensions Siamese Twins?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1157, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Klaus Jaeger & Wolfgang Kuhle, 2009. "The optimum growth rate for population reconsidered," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 22(1), pages 23-41, January.
    6. Miguel Sánchez-Romero & Concepció Patxot & Elisenda Rentería & Guadalupe Souto, 2013. "On the effects of public and private transfers on capital accumulation: some lessons from the NTA aggregates," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(4), pages 1409-1430, October.
    7. Concepció Patxot & Elisenda Rentería & Miguel Romero & Guadalupe Souto, 2012. "Measuring the balance of government intervention on forward and backward family transfers using NTA estimates: the modified Lee arrows," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(3), pages 442-461, June.
    8. Rydell, Ingrid, 2005. "Equity, Justice, Interdependence: Intergenerational Transfers and the Ageing Population," Arbetsrapport 2005:5, Institute for Futures Studies.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    education; stochastic fertility; child benefits; pensions; scholarships; social capital; asymmetric information; multi-agency;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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