Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard
Student loans, even income-contingent ones, are not optimal. Potential university students with the appropriate characteristics should be offered a scholarship, dependent on both need and merit. The award of the scholarship should be conditional on the choice of university degree, but students with a natural aptitude for studies that do not hold the prospect of a well paid job should not be pushed towards potentially more lucrative ones. The scheme should be financed by a graduate tax that re-distributes from the better paid to the academically more successful.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich|
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo-group.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salvatore Barbaro, 2002.
"The Distributional Impact of Subsidies to Higher Education - Empirical Evidence from Germany,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(4), pages 458-458, December.
- Salvatore Barbaro, 2002. "The Distributional Impact of Subsidies to Higher Education - Empirical Evidence from Germany," Departmental Discussion Papers 114, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Barbaro, Salvatore, 2002. "The distributional impact of subsidies to higher education: empirical evidence from Germany," FiBS-Forum 11, Forschungsinstitut für Bildungs- und Sozialökonomie (FiBS).
- Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1165-1177, May.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Transfers to Families with Children as a Principal-Agent Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 351, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Tranfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," CHILD Working Papers wp02_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard, 1994. "The First-Order Approach to Multi-signal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 459-466, March.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_973. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.