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Financing schemes for higher education

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  • Del Rey, Elena
  • Racionero, María

Abstract

Most industrial countries have traditionally subsidized the provision of higher education. Alternative financing schemes, which rely on larger contributions from students, are being increasingly adopted. Those based on income-contingent loans provide insurance against uncertain educational outcomes. We consider a unified framework where we analyze the following schemes: 1) the traditional tax-subsidy, 2) pure loans, 3) income-contingent loans with risk-sharing, and 4) income-contingent loans with risk-pooling. We focus on their insurance role and their effect on higher education participation. We show that an income-contingent loan with risk-pooling can induce the optimal level of participation provided that it covers both financial costs of education and forgone earnings.

Suggested Citation

  • Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, María, 2010. "Financing schemes for higher education," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:104-113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bas Jacobs & Frederick Van Der Ploeg, 2006. "Guide to reform of higher education: a European perspective," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 21(47), pages 535-592, July.
    2. Barr, Nicholas, 2001. "The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199246595.
    3. Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, María, 2010. "Financing schemes for higher education," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
    4. Nicholas Barr & Iain Crawford, 1998. "Funding Higher Education in an Age of Expansion," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 45-70.
    5. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 55-87, February.
    6. Chapman, Bruce, 2006. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reforms," Handbook of the Economics of Education, Elsevier.
    7. Bruce Chapman & Andrew Leigh, 2009. "Do Very High Tax Rates Induce Bunching? Implications for the Design of Income Contingent Loan Schemes," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 85(270), pages 276-289, September.
    8. Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 39-42.
    9. Nerlove, Marc L, 1975. "Some Problems in the Use of Income-contingent Loans for the Finance of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 157-183, February.
    10. Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia & Walde, Klaus, 2000. "Efficiency and Equity Effects of Subsidies to Higher Education," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 702-722, October.
    11. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joan Rosselló, 2007. "Does a public university system avoid the stratification of public universities and the segregation of students?," DEA Working Papers 26, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
    2. Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2015. "Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 546-576, September.
    3. Rainald Borck & Silke Uebelmesser & Martin Wimbersky, 2015. "The Political Economics of Higher-Education Finance for Mobile Individuals," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 71(1), pages 82-105, March.
    4. Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, María, 2010. "Financing schemes for higher education," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
    5. Alexander Kemnitz, 2007. "University Funding Reform, Competition, and Teaching Quality," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 356-378, June.
    6. Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2012. "Voting On Income‐Contingent Loans For Higher Education," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(s1), pages 38-50, June.
    7. Rainald Borck & Martin Wimbersky, 2014. "Political economics of higher education finance," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 115-139, January.
    8. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2017. "Student loans: When is risk sharing desirable?," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 13(2), pages 217-231, June.
    9. Ben Heijdra & Fabian Kindermann & Laurie Reijnders, 2017. "Life in shakles? The quantitative implications of reforming the educational financing system," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 25, pages 37-57, April.
    10. Maria Racionero & Elena Del Rey, 2012. "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling," CEPR Discussion Papers 671, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    11. Ben J. Heijdra & Fabian Kindermann & Laurie S. M. Reijnders, 2014. "Life in Shackles? The Quantitative Implications of Reforming the Educational Loan System," CESifo Working Paper Series 5013, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Rosemary Walker & Liviu Florea, 2014. "Easy-Come-Easy-Go: Moral Hazard in the Context of Return to Education," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 120(2), pages 201-217, March.
    13. V. Vandenberghe & O. Debande, 2007. "Deferred and Income-contingent Tuition Fees: An Empirical Assessment using Belgian, German and UK Data," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 421-440.
    14. Juha KETTUNEN, 2016. "The Performance-Based Funding Scheme of Universities," Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy Journal, College of Management, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, vol. 4(1), pages 109-124, March.
    15. repec:bla:coecpo:v:35:y:2017:i:4:p:615-629 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency Higher education finance;

    JEL classification:

    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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