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Financing schemes for higher education

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  • Del Rey, Elena
  • Racionero, María

Abstract

Most industrial countries have traditionally subsidized the provision of higher education. Alternative financing schemes, which rely on larger contributions from students, are being increasingly adopted. Those based on income-contingent loans provide insurance against uncertain educational outcomes. We consider a unified framework where we analyze the following schemes: 1) the traditional tax-subsidy, 2) pure loans, 3) income-contingent loans with risk-sharing, and 4) income-contingent loans with risk-pooling. We focus on their insurance role and their effect on higher education participation. We show that an income-contingent loan with risk-pooling can induce the optimal level of participation provided that it covers both financial costs of education and forgone earnings.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 104-113

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:104-113
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Keywords: Efficiency Higher education finance;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
  • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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  1. Del Rey, Elena & Racionero, María, 2010. "Financing schemes for higher education," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-113, March.
  2. Nerlove, Marc L, 1975. "Some Problems in the Use of Income-contingent Loans for the Finance of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(1), pages 157-83, February.
  3. Chapman, Bruce, 2006. "Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: International Reforms," Handbook of the Economics of Education, Elsevier.
  4. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 55-87, 02.
  5. Dionne, Georges & Eeckhoudt, Louis, 1985. "Self-insurance, self-protection and increased risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 39-42.
  6. Nicholas Barr & Iain Crawford, 1998. "Funding Higher Education in an Age of Expansion," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 45-70.
  7. Barr, Nicholas, 2001. "The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of the State," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199246595, March.
  8. Jacobs, Bas & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2005. "Guide to Reform of Higher Education: A European Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 5327, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia & Walde, Klaus, 2000. "Efficiency and Equity Effects of Subsidies to Higher Education," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 702-22, October.
  10. Bruce Chapman & Andrew Leigh, 2006. "Do Very High Tax Rates Induce Bunching? Implications for the Design of Income-Contingent Loan Schemes," CEPR Discussion Papers 521, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
  11. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
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Cited by:

  1. Jordi Jofre-Monseny & Martin Wimbersky, 2010. "Political economics of higher education finance," Working Papers 2010/17, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  2. Maria Racionero & Elena Del Rey, 2006. "Financing schemes for higher education," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2006-460, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  3. Übelmesser, Silke & Borck, Rainald & Wimbersky, Martin, 2013. "The Political Economics of Higher Education Finance for Mobile Individuals," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79717, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  4. Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2012. "Voting On Income‐Contingent Loans For Higher Education," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(s1), pages 38-50, 06.
  5. Joan Rosselló, 2007. "Does a public university system avoid the stratification of public universities and the segregation of students?," DEA Working Papers 26, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
  6. Kemnitz, Alexander, 2007. "University Funding Reform, Competition and Teaching Quality," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 01/07, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  7. Elena Del Rey & María Racionero, 2014. "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-pooling," Working Papers 2014/7, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  8. Alain Trannoy & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2014. "Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," AMSE Working Papers 1416, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised 02 Apr 2014.
  9. Ben J. Heijdra & Fabian Kindermann & Laurie S. M. Reijnders, 2014. "Life in Shackles? The Quantitative Implications of Reforming the Educational Loan System," CESifo Working Paper Series 5013, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2014. "Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Working Papers halshs-00993124, HAL.
  11. Rosemary Walker & Liviu Florea, 2014. "Easy-Come-Easy-Go: Moral Hazard in the Context of Return to Education," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 120(2), pages 201-217, March.

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