Student Loans and the Allocation of Graduate Jobs
In an economy where graduate jobs are allocated by tournament, and some of the potential participants cannot borrow against their expected future earnings, the government can increase efficiency and ex ante equity by redistributing wealth or, if that is not possible, by borrowing wholesale and lending to potential participants. Both policies replace some of the less able rich with some of the more able poor and bring education investments closer to their first-best levels.
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- Massimiliano Bratti & Abigail McKnight & Robin Naylor & Jeremy Smith, 2004.
"Higher education outcomes, graduate employment and university performance indicators,"
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A,
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- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 55-87, 02.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2003. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 973, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Raquel Fernández & Jordi Gali, 1999. "To Each According to …? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 799-824.
- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug.. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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