Efficient Tuition Fees and Examinations
We assume that students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability and that universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. If the university observes a private signal of each student's ability, which is soft information, then asymmetries of information are two-sided, and the optimal admission policy involves a mix of pricing and pre-entry selection, based on the university's private information. In contrast, if all test results are public knowledge, then there is no sorting on the basis of test scores: Tuition alone does the job of implementing an optimal degree of student self-selection. These results do not depend on the existence of peer effects. The optimal tuition follows a classic marginal social-cost pricing rule. (JEL: D82, H42, I22, J24) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 6 (2008)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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