Higher education, elite institutions and inequality
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Masashi Tanaka, 2013. "Human capital investment, Signaling, and Wage differentials," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
- Wei-Bin Zhang, 2016. "Impact of Education Subsidies and Taxation on Wealth and Human Capital Accumulation," Eastern European Business and Economics Journal, Eastern European Business and Economics Studies Centre, vol. 2(3), pages 222-247.
- Annika C. Froehlich, 2016. "Does the curricular structure affect doctoral enrolment?," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 86(9), pages 1067-1089, December.
- Wei-Bin Zhang, 2015. "National Education and Global Economic Growth: A Synthesis of the Uzawa–Lucas Two-Sector and the Oniki–Uzawa Trade Models," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 6(4), pages 905-928, December.
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KeywordsHigher education Returns to education Inequality Signalling;
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