Self-selection in the state school system
With diminishing returns to the peer group, it is optimal social policy to mix children in schools. We consider what happens when, contrary to the outcome being determined by a social planner, schools and children are free to seek each other out: with some caveats, this leads to perfect segregation by child quality. It is shown that this is the worst possible outcome. We show also that a competitive system produces the optimal allocation of children to schools.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 11 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CEDE20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CEDE20|