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The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?

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  • Sanghoon Lee

Abstract

American students study harder in college than in high school, whereas East Asian students study harder in high school than in college. This article proposes a signaling explanation. Signaling may occur over time both in high school and in college, and societies may differ in the timing of signaling. Students work harder in the signaling stage determined by the society as a whole. A testable implication is that high ability workers in East Asia are more concentrated among a few colleges than their U.S. counterparts. This implication is confirmed by top CEO education profile data in the United States and Korea. Copyright 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanghoon Lee, 2007. "The Timing Of Signaling: To Study In High School Or In College?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 785-807, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:48:y:2007:i:3:p:785-807
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bergh, Andreas & Fink, Günther, 2009. "Higher education, elite institutions and inequality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 376-384, April.
    2. Cho, Sungjin & Kam, Jihye & Lee, Soohyung, 2017. "Efficient Supply of Human Capital: Role of College Major," IZA Discussion Papers 10610, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Wei-Bin ZHANG, 2014. "Gender Discrimination, Education and Economic Growth in a Generalized Uzawa-Lucas Two-Sector Model," Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, West University of Timisoara, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 7(1), pages 1-34.
    4. Wei-Bin Zhang, 2016. "Impact of Education Subsidies and Taxation on Wealth and Human Capital Accumulation," Eastern European Business and Economics Journal, Eastern European Business and Economics Studies Centre, vol. 2(3), pages 222-247.
    5. Dong, Baomin & Fu, Shihe & Gong, Jiong & Fan, Hanwen, 2014. "The Lame Drain," MPRA Paper 53825, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Wei-Bin ZHANG, 2014. "Human Capital, Wealth, and Renewable Resources," Expert Journal of Economics, Sprint Investify, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20.
    7. Changhui Kang & Sam-Ho Lee, 2015. "Being Knowledgeable or Sociable? Different Patterns of Human Capital Development and Evaluation in Cognitive and Non-cognitive Skills," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 31, pages 57-87.
    8. repec:etc:journl:y:2018:i:17:p:122-145 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Hartog, Joop & Sun, Yuze & Ding, Xiaohao, 2010. "University rank and bachelor's labour market positions in China," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 971-979, December.
    10. Christopher Avery & Soohyung Lee & Alvin E. Roth, 2014. "College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea," NBER Working Papers 20774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Masashi Tanaka, 2013. "Human capital investment, Signaling, and Wage differentials," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
    12. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2008. "Student Selection and Incentives," TWI Research Paper Series 42, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    13. Zhang Wei-Bin, 2012. "Education and Human Capital Accumulation in a Two -Sector Growth Model with Elastic Labor Supply," Scientific Annals of Economics and Business, De Gruyter Open, vol. 59(1), pages 289-309, July.

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