Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs
In an economy where graduate jobs are allocated by a matching tournament, and some of the potential participants cannot borrow against their expected future earnings, the government can increase efficiency and ex ante equity by redistributing wealth or, if that is not possible, by borrowing wholesale and lending to potential participants. Both policies replace some of the less able rich with some of the more able poor and bring education investments closer to their first-best levels.
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- Massimiliano Bratti & Abigail McKnight & Robin Naylor & Jeremy Smith, 2004.
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97-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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- Fernández, Raquel & Galí, Jordi, 1997. "To Each According To...? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 1627, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2009.
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Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 55-87, 02.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2003. "Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 973, CESifo Group Munich.
- Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2008. "Efficient Tuition Fees and Examinations," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(6), pages 1211-1243, December.
- Karla Hoff & Andrew B. Lyon, 1994.
"Non-Leaky Buckets: Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Agency Costs,"
NBER Working Papers
4652, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hoff, Karla & Lyon, Andrew B., 1995. "Non-leaky buckets: Optimal redistributive taxation and agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 365-390, November.
- Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
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