The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings
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Cited by:
- Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2014.
"Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 174-189.
- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Instrumental Cardinal Concerns for Social Status in Two-Sided Matching with Non-Transferable Utility," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 095, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
- Lauermann, Stephan & Nöldeke, Georg, 2014.
"Stable marriages and search frictions,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 163-195.
- Stephan Lauermann & Georg Nöldeke, 2012. "Stable Marriages and Search Frictions," Working papers 2012/10, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2008. "Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 163-174, June.
- Mario Vozar, 2010. "The Effect of Time in a Multi-Dimensional Marriage Market Model," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp417, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Flanders, Sam, 2014. "Matching Markets with N-Dimensional Preferences," MPRA Paper 53669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2010. "Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 177-179, March.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007.
"Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2002. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-149, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Nov 2004.
- Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2003. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Economics Working Papers 0030, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Flanders, Sam, 2013. "Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences," MPRA Paper 53668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alkan, Ahmet & Anbarci, Nejat & Sarpça, Sinan, 2012. "An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 500-504.
- Kohei Kawamura & József Sákovics, 2014.
"Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(5), pages 487-501, November.
- Kohei, Kawamura & József, Sákovics, 2013. "Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-15, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Kohei Kawamura & Jozsef Sakovics, 2013. "Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers," ESE Discussion Papers 221, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
- Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017.
"Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1507-1534, June.
- Cherchye, Laurens & Demuynck, Thomas & De Rock, Bram & Vermeulen, Frederic, 2014. "Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable," IZA Discussion Papers 8070, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017. "Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/251990, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK & Frederic VERMEULEN, 2014. "Household consumption when the marriage is stable," Working Papers Department of Economics ces14.08, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2014. "Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-21, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Klumpp, Tilman, 2009. "Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(5-6), pages 376-390, May.
- Kominers, Scott Duke, 2010. "Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 773-780, March.
- Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2014. "Household consumption when marriage is stable," IFS Working Papers W14/26, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Wang, X. & Agatz, N.A.H. & Erera, A., 2015. "Stable Matching for Dynamic Ride-sharing Systems," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2015-006-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Nikhil Agarwal, 2015.
"An Empirical Model of the Medical Match,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 1939-1978, July.
- Nikhil Agarwal, 2014. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match," NBER Working Papers 20767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2013.
"Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 143-156.
- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 094, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
- Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2007. "Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince :assortative matching in a nontransferable world," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7022, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2006. "The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching," 2006 Meeting Papers 176, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Holzman, Ron & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 277-285.
- repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0543-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:matsoc:v:91:y:2018:i:c:p:42-50 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nikhil Agarwal & William Diamond, 2013. "Identification and Estimation in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1905, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2014.
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