Designing a Competitive Monotone Signaling Equilibrium
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More about this item
Keywords
optimal equilibrium design; monotone signaling equilibrium; stronger monotone belief; Criterion D1;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2021-09-13 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DES-2021-09-13 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2021-09-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ISF-2021-09-13 (Islamic Finance)
- NEP-MIC-2021-09-13 (Microeconomics)
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