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Evolution of Individual Preferences and Persistence of Family Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Cigno, Alessandro

    (University of Florence)

  • Gioffré, Alessandro

    (University of Florence)

  • Luporini, Annalisa

    (University of Florence)

Abstract

How does the distribution of individual preferences evolve as a result of marriage between individuals with different preferences? Could a family rule be self-enforcing given individual preferences, and remain such for several generations despite preference evolution? We show that it is in a couple's common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of attention to their elderly parents if the couple's preferences satisfy a certain condition, and the same condition is rationally expected to hold also where their children and respective spouses are concerned. Given uncertainty about who their children will marry, a couple's expectations will reflect the probability distribution of preferences in the next generation. We show that, in any given generation, some couples may obey the rule in question and some may not. It is also possible that a couple will obey the rule, but their descendants will not for a number of generations, and then obey it again. The policy implications are briefly discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Cigno, Alessandro & Gioffré, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa, 2019. "Evolution of Individual Preferences and Persistence of Family Rules," IZA Discussion Papers 12373, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12373
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Cigno, 2022. "A strictly economic explanation of gender roles: the lasting legacy of the plough," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 1-13, March.
    2. Keisuke Kawata & Mizuki Komura, 2023. "Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market," Papers 2307.15336, arXiv.org.
    3. Alessandro Cigno & Alessandro Gioffré & Annalisa Luporini, 2021. "Evolution of individual preferences and persistence of family rules," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 935-958, December.
    4. Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2021. "Preference evolution in different matching markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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