Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange
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- Antonio Rangel, 2000. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange," NBER Working Papers 7518, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Cigno, A., 2016.
"Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security,"
Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.),Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-660,
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- Poutvaara, Panu, 2004. "Gerontocracy revisited: Unilateral transfer to the young may benefit the middle-aged," Munich Reprints in Economics 19295, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Antoine Bommier & Ronald Lee & Tim Miller & Stéphane Zuber, 2010.
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Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 36(1), pages 1-26, March.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IND-2000-01-24 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2000-01-24 (Microeconomics)
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