IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jleorg/v6y1990i1p33-63.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Bendor, Jonathan
  • Mookherjee, Dilip

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1990. "Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 33-63, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:1:p:33-63
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. French, Kenneth R & McCormick, Robert E, 1984. "Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 417-441, October.
    2. Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number auer88-1, January.
    3. Daniel R. Vincent, 1990. "Dynamic Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 49-61.
    4. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    5. Hirshleifer, David, 1989. "Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt2496649g, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    6. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
    7. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. " Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 611-632, July.
    8. Nathan, Kevin S. & O'Keefe, Terrence B., 1989. "The rise in takeover premiums : An exploratory study," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 101-119, June.
    9. Steven Kaplan, 1989. "Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 611-632, July.
    10. Michael C. Jensen, 1987. "The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 31, pages 102-148.
    11. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
    12. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    13. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    14. Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, 1984. "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 54-68, Spring.
    15. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers," NBER Chapters,in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 101-136 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Schwartz, Alan, 1986. "Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 229-253, Fall.
    17. Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
    18. Michael J. Fishman, 1988. "A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring.
    19. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    20. Harstad, Ronald M, 1990. "Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 421-429, April.
    21. Lloyd, William P. & Modani, Naval K. & Hand, John H., 1987. "The effect of the degree of ownership control on firm diversification, market value, and merger activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 303-312, August.
    22. Bhattacharyya, S., 1990. "The Analytics Of Takeover Bidding: Initial Bids And Their Premia," GSIA Working Papers 89-90-03, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    23. Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Auctions and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 325-344, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali, 2014. "Variable temptations and black mark reputations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 70-90.
    2. Scoppa Vincenzo, 2003. "Contratti incompleti ed enforcement endogeno. Una rassegna della letteratura," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 391-440.
    3. Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2010. "Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 239-258, June.
    4. repec:eee:joepsy:v:62:y:2017:i:c:p:204-230 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March.
    6. Brandt, Loren & Hosios, Arthur J, 1996. "Credit, Incentives, and Reputation: A Hedonic Analysis of Contractual Wage Profiles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1172-1226, December.
    7. Antonio Rangel, 1999. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange," Working Papers 00001, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    8. David L. Dickinson & E. Glenn Dutcher & Cortney S. Rodet, 2011. "Punishment History and Spillover Effects: A Laboratory Investigation of Behavior in a Social Dilemma," Working Papers 11-02, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    9. Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1225, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Jody Lipford & Bruce Yandle, 1997. "Exploring the Production of Social Order," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 37-55, March.
    11. Jiahua Che & Gerald Willmann, 2009. "The Economics of a Multilateral Investment Agreement," CESifo Working Paper Series 2562, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Felipe Balmaceda & Juan Esconar, 2013. "Trust in Cohesive Communities," Documentos de Trabajo 295, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    13. Alexander E. Saak, 2012. "Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(3), pages 763-785.
    14. Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 2002. "Contractual Intermediaries," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 362-384, October.
    15. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior," Working Papers 0545, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    16. Goeschl, Timo & Jürgens, Ole, 2012. "Explaining uniformity in rule design: The role of citizen participation in enforcement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 166-177.
    17. Gani Aldashev & Giorgio Zanarone, 2014. "Endogenous Enforcement Institutions," Working Papers 1403, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    18. repec:kap:policy:v:50:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11077-017-9290-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Stewart, James I., 2009. "Cooperation when N is large: Evidence from the mining camps of the American West," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 213-225, March.
    20. Mukherji, Ananda & Francis, John D., 2008. "Mutual adaptation in buyer-supplier relationships," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 154-161, February.
    21. John William Hatfield, 2008. "Backward Intergenerational Goods and Endogenous Fertility," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(5), pages 765-784, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:1:p:33-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jleo .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.