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On the political economy of social security and public education

  • Panu Poutvaara


I analyze simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education using a model with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. I derive the results both for a once-and-for-all voting system with commitment and for repeated voting. My model allows demographic change and productivity growth. Even when cohorts are of the same size, the median voter may be a young uneducated citizen.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 345-365

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:19:y:2006:i:2:p:345-365
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