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Economic Growth and the Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution

  • Tetsuo Ono

    ()

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

This paper presents an overlapping-generation model featuring probabilistic vot- ing over two policy issues, namely, pension and public goods. To capture the forward-looking behavior of voters, we characterize a Markov-perfect political equi- librium in which the two policy variables are conditioned on a payoff-relevant state variable, that is, capital. It is shown that (i) as the population ages, the pension- to-GDP ratio and the growth rate of capital increase, but the public goods-to-GDP ratio decreases and (ii) the pension-to-GDP and public goods-to-GDP ratios are too high and the growth rate too low from the standpoint of social welfare.

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File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1417.pdf
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Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 14-17.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1417
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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