IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Economic Growth and the Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution

  • Tetsuo Ono

    ()

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

This paper presents an overlapping-generation model featuring probabilistic vot- ing over two policy issues, namely, pension and public goods. To capture the forward-looking behavior of voters, we characterize a Markov-perfect political equi- librium in which the two policy variables are conditioned on a payoff-relevant state variable, that is, capital. It is shown that (i) as the population ages, the pension- to-GDP ratio and the growth rate of capital increase, but the public goods-to-GDP ratio decreases and (ii) the pension-to-GDP and public goods-to-GDP ratios are too high and the growth rate too low from the standpoint of social welfare.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1417.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 14-17.

as
in new window

Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1417
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Conde-Ruiz, J.I. & Galasso, V., 2000. "Positive Arithmetic of the Welfare State," Economics Working Papers eco2000/23, European University Institute.
  2. Gonzalez-Eiras, Marti­n & Niepelt, Dirk, 2008. "The future of social security," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 197-218, March.
  3. Panu Poutvaara, 2006. "On the political economy of social security and public education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 345-365, June.
  4. Bearse, P. & Glomm, G. & Jeneba, E., 1999. "Composition of Government Budget, Non-Single Peakedness and Majority Voting," Papers 9903, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory.
  5. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso, 2003. "Early Retirement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 12-36, January.
  6. Jorge Soares, 2006. "A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 367-389, June.
  7. John Creedy & Shuyun May Li & Solmaz Moslehi, 2011. "The Composition Of Government Expenditure: Economic Conditions And Preferences," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(1), pages 94-107, 01.
  8. Kenneth R. Beauchemin, 1998. "Intergenerational Politics, Fiscal Policy and Productivity," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(4), pages 835-858, October.
  9. Boldrin, Michele, 2005. "Public education and capital accumulation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 85-109, June.
  10. Arawatari, Ryo & Ono, Tetsuo, 2009. "A second chance at success: A political economy perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1249-1277, May.
  11. Michael Kaganovich & Volker Meier, 2012. "Social Security Systems, Human Capital, and Growth in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 573-600, 08.
  12. Zheng Song & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Rotten parents and disciplined children: a politico-economic theory of public expenditure and debt," IEW - Working Papers 325, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  13. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 1995. "Is Social Security Really Bad For Growth?," Working Papers 218, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  14. Zheng Song & Kaiji Chen, 2009. "Markovian Social Security in Unequal Societies," 2009 Meeting Papers 318, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. Conde-Ruiz, J. Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2004. "The macroeconomics of early retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1849-1869, August.
  16. Dirk Niepelt & Martin Gonzalez-Eiras, 2010. "Ageing, Government Budgets, Retirement, and Growth," 2010 Meeting Papers 69, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Creedy, John & Moslehi, Solmaz, 2009. "Modelling the composition of government expenditure in democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 42-55, March.
  18. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 1995. "Is Social Security Really Bad For Growth?," Working Papers 218, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  19. Hassler, John & Krusell, Per & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2005. "The dynamics of government," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1331-1358, October.
  20. Lorenzo Forni, 2005. "Social Security as Markov Equilibrium in OLG Models," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 178-194, January.
  21. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2003. "The Survival of the Welfare State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 87-112, March.
  22. Lancia, Francesco & Russo, Alessia, 2010. "A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergenerational Contracts," MPRA Paper 24795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Lovely, Mary E. & Tosun, Mehmet S., 2004. "Generational conflict, fiscal policy, and economic growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-23, March.
  24. Marco Bassetto, 1999. "Political economy of taxation in an overlapping-generations economy," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 133, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  25. Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe & Guadalupe Valera, 2012. "Social security reform and the support for public education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 609-634, January.
  26. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Paola Profeta, 2007. "The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems," Working Papers 2007-07, FEDEA.
  27. Antonio Rangel, 2003. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 813-834, June.
  28. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
  29. repec:fda:fdaddt:2003-05 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Zheng Song, 2011. "The Dynamics of Inequality and Social Security in General Equilibrium," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(4), pages 613-635, October.
  31. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2009. "Inequality, Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 09-12-Rev.2, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised Feb 2010.
  32. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1998. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1299-1329, September.
  33. Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(2), pages 335-57, April.
  34. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka & Phillip Swagel, 2002. "The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 900-918, August.
  35. Konrad, Kai A, 1995. "Social Security and Strategic Inter-vivos Transfers of Social Capital," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 315-26, August.
  36. Bernasconi, Michele & Profeta, Paola, 2012. "Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 84-96.
  37. Bethencourt, Carlos & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2008. "Political complements in the welfare state: Health care and social security," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 609-632, April.
  38. Phillip Swagel & Efraim Sadka & Assaf Razin, 2002. "The Aging of the Population and the Size of the Welfare State," IMF Working Papers 02/68, International Monetary Fund.
  39. Alexander Kemnitz, 2000. "Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 443-462.
  40. Azariadis, Costas & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2002. "Fiscal Constitutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 255-281, April.
  41. Tosun, Mehmet Serkan, 2008. "Endogenous fiscal policy and capital market transmissions in the presence of demographic shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 2031-2060, June.
  42. Naito, Katsuyuki, 2010. "Two-sided Intergenerational Transfer Policy and Economic Development: A Politico-economic Approach," MPRA Paper 21020, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  43. Naito, Katsuyuki, 2012. "Two-sided intergenerational transfer policy and economic development: A politico-economic approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1340-1348.
  44. Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January.
  45. Paul M Romer, 1999. "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2232, David K. Levine.
  46. Hassler, John & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2003. "Democratic Public Good Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4044, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  47. Kaganovich, Michael & Zilcha, Itzhak, 2012. "Pay-as-you-go or funded social security? A general equilibrium comparison," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 455-467.
  48. repec:fda:fdaddt:2003-03 is not listed on IDEAS
  49. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  50. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2013. "The Political Economy of Social Security in a Borrowing-Constrained Economy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(3), pages 448-476, 06.
  51. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Atsuko SUZUKI)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.