A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis of the Political Economy of Public Education
The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the impact of public funding of education on social security benefits and its impact on factor prices. I then focus on the impact of implementing a social security system on the equilibrium levels of education funding and on welfare. I find that although, in the benchmark economy, the presence of social security might generate support for public funding of education, its overall effect on the well-being of individuals is negative for any level of social security taxation.
|Date of creation:||2005|
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