Composition of Government Budget, Non-Single Peakedness and Majority Voting
In this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single-peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revennues is used to finance a uniform lump-sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of the government budget. We show that the single-crossing property cannot be invoked to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, EAST LANSING MICHIGAN 48824 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://econ.msu.edu/
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