Investment in Education and Redistributive Taxation without Precommitment
This paper compares private investment in risky education in a laissezfaire economy and with income redistribution. Obtaining higher education requires time and may require paying nondeductible resource costs. The paper shows that redistributive taxation may actually increase private investment in risky education also without precommitment.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Publication status:||Published in FinanzArchiv 2 59(2003): pp. 177-188|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995.
" A Theory of the Welfare State,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 495-526, December.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1994. "A Theory of the Welfare State," CESifo Working Paper Series 65, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995. "A Theory of the Welfare State," CEPR Discussion Papers 1278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1994. "A Theory of the Welfare State," NBER Working Papers 4856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1989. "Why Is Investment Subsidized?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 549-559, August.
- Anderberg Dan & Perroni Carlo, 2003. "Time-Consistent Policy and Politics: Does Voting Matter When Individuals Are Identical?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-19, March.
- Andersson, Frederik & Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Globalization and human capital formation
[Globalisierung und Humankapitalinvestitionen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 245, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 171-189, May.
- Boadway, R. & Marceau, N. & Marchand, M., "undated". "Investment in education and the time inconsistency of redistributive tax policy," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1219, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Maurice Marchand, 1992. "Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy," Working Papers 860, Queen's University, Department of Economics.