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Globalization and Human Capital Formation

Author

Listed:
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Andersson, Fredrik

Abstract

This Paper compares education investment in closed and open economies without government and with a benevolent government. Closed economies suffer from a hold-up problem of excessive redistribution, and governments use education policy as a second-best tool. Globalization that increases labour mobility reduces governments' incentives to provide subsidized education and increases private individuals' incentives for investment in their human capital. Globalization can improve welfare, and even restore full efficiency. Governments' scope for redistribution ? which is a substitute for private income insurance ? is reduced, and whether efficiency is restored depends on how private insurance markets react to the change in redistribution policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Konrad, Kai A. & Andersson, Fredrik, 2001. "Globalization and Human Capital Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2657
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    Cited by:

    1. Grace Yuehan Wang, 2022. "Talent Migration in Knowledge Economy: The Case of China’s Silicon Valley, Shenzhen," Journal of International Migration and Integration, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 1175-1196, September.
    2. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, "undated". "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    3. Alexander Haupt & Eckhard Janeba, 2003. "Bildung im Zeitalter mobilen Humankapitals," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(2), pages 173-187.
    4. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August.
    5. Elsayyad, May & Konrad, Kai A., 2012. "Fighting multiple tax havens," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 295-305.
    6. Panu Poutvaara, 2002. "Investment in Education and Redistributive Taxation without Precommitment," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(2), pages 177-188, May.
    7. Oliver Busch & Benjamin Weigert, 2010. "Where have all the graduates gone? Internal cross-state migration of graduates in Germany 1984–2004," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 44(3), pages 559-572, June.
    8. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve & Wilson, John D., 2010. "Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 249-259, March.
    9. van Praag, Bernard M. S. & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada, 2001. "Age-Differentiated QALY Losses," IZA Discussion Papers 314, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Alexander Haupt & Eckhard Janeba, 2009. "Education, redistribution and the threat of brain drain," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(1), pages 1-24, February.
    11. Thum, Claudio & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2003. "Mobility and the Role of Education as a Commitment Device," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(5), pages 549-564, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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