A constitutional theory of the family
The paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identi?es circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with the predictions of more conventional models.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cigno, Alessandro & Giannelli, Gianna Claudia & Rosati, Furio C. & Vuri, Daniela, 2004.
"Is There Such a Thing as a Family Constitution? A Test Based on Credit Rationing,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1116, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Alessandro Cigno & Gianna Giannelli & Furio Rosati & Daniela Vuri, 2006. "Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 183-204, 09.
- Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1987.
"Renegotiation in Repeated Games,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt9wv3h5jb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, "undated".
"A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility,"
University of Chicago - Population Research Center
85-11, Chicago - Population Research Center.
- Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, 1988. "A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25.
- Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, 1986. "A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility," NBER Working Papers 1793, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
- Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
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