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Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention

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  • Alessandro Cigno

    () (University of Florence)

  • Mizuki Komura

    (Musashi University)

  • Annalisa Luporini

    (University of Florence)

Abstract

Abstract We demonstrate that the notion of a family ‘constitution’ (self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof norm) requiring adults to provide attention for their elderly parents carries over from a world where identical individuals reproduce asexually, to one where individuals differentiated by sex and preferences marry, have children and bargain over the allocation of domestic resources. In this heterogenous world, couples are sorted by their preferences. If a couple’s common preferences satisfy a certain condition, the couple have an interest in instilling those preferences into their children. Policies are generally nonneutral. In particular, wage redistribution may raise, and compulsory education will reduce, the share of the adult population that is governed by family constitutions, and thus the share of the elderly population who receive attention from their children.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Cigno & Mizuki Komura & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 805-834, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:30:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00148-017-0639-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s00148-017-0639-y
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    1. repec:eee:hapoch:v1_609 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:spr:jopoec:v:31:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00148-017-0681-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Cigno, A., 2016. "Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Support of the elderly; Marriage; Matching; Family constitution; Preference transmission; Policy neutrality;

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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