IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market

  • Chiappori, Pierre-André

    ()

    (Columbia University)

  • Iyigun, Murat

    ()

    (University of Colorado, Boulder)

  • Weiss, Yoram

    ()

    (Tel Aviv University)

We present a model with pre-marital schooling investment, endogenous marital matching and spousal specialization in homework and market production. Investment in schooling raises ages and generates two kinds of returns in our framework: a labor-market return and a marriage-market return because education can affect the intra-marital share of the surplus one can extract from marriage. When the returns to education and household roles are gender neutral, men and women educate in equal proportions and there is pure positive assortative matching in the marriage market. But if men and women have different market returns or household roles, then there may be mixing in equilibrium where some educated individuals marry uneducated spouses and those who educate less extract a relatively larger share of the marital surplus. The existence of large and frictionless marriage markets creates competition among potential spouses, precludes bargaining and generates premarital investments that are efficient. Given that the gender wage gap narrows with the level of education, women’s labor-market return from schooling is higher than that of men. Moreover, women’s household time obligations have declined over time, raising their marriage-market return from schooling. Combining these two effects, we explain why women now attain higher schooling levels than men.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp2454.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2454.

as
in new window

Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: American Economic Review, 2009, 99 (5), 1689-1713
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2454
Contact details of provider: Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information: Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jeremy Greenwood & Ananth Seshadri & Mehmet Yorukoglu, 2003. "Engines of Liberation," RCER Working Papers 503, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Ming-Ching Luoh, 2003. "Gender Differences in Completed Schooling," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(3), pages 559-577, August.
  3. Katz, Lawrence F. & Autor, David H., 1999. "Changes in the wage structure and earnings inequality," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 26, pages 1463-1555 Elsevier.
  4. Casey B. Mulligan & Yona Rubinstein, 2005. "Selection, Investment, and Women's Relative Wages Since 1975," NBER Working Papers 11159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Albanesi, Stefania & Olivetti, Claudia, 2007. "Gender Roles and Technological Progress," CEPR Discussion Papers 6352, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
  7. Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher, 2005. "Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts," IZA Discussion Papers 1821, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2000. "Competing Pre-marital Investments," Working Papers peters-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  9. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1998. "Efficient non-contractible investments," Staff Report 253, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  10. Shannon N. Seitz, 1999. "Labor Supply, Divorce and Remarriage," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9902, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  11. Hans Bloemen & Elena Stancanelli, 2008. "Modelling the employment and wage outcomes of spouses: Is she outearning him?," Working Papers hal-01066118, HAL.
  12. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Departmental Working Papers 1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
  13. Hadfield, Gillian K., 1999. "A coordination model of the sexual division of labor," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 125-153, October.
  14. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Vagstad, Steinar, 2000. "Mommy Tracks and Public Policy: On Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Gender Gaps in Promotion," CEPR Discussion Papers 2378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Reuben Gronau, 1982. "Sex-Related Wage Differentials and Women's Interrupted Labor Careers--The Chicken or the Egg," NBER Working Papers 1002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Felli, L. & Roberts, K., 2000. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Economics Papers 2000-w11, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  17. Burda, Michael C. & Hamermesh, Daniel S. & Weil, Philippe, 2006. "The Distribution of Total Work in the EU and US," IZA Discussion Papers 2270, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  18. Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2001. "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 333-373, December.
  19. Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polacheck, 1974. "Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 397-431 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," IZA Discussion Papers 3892, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  21. Mincer, Jacob & Polachek, Solomon, 1974. "Family Investment in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S76-S108, Part II, .
  22. Iyigun, Murat, 2005. "Bargaining and Specialization in Marriage," IZA Discussion Papers 1744, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  23. Paul Glewwe, 1999. "Why Does Mother's Schooling Raise Child Health in Developing Countries? Evidence from Morocco," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(1), pages 124-159.
  24. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," Cahiers de recherche 0103, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  25. Murat Nick & P. Randall Walsh, 2007. "Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 507-535.
  26. Yoram Weiss, 1981. "Expected Interruptions in Labor Force Participation and Sex Related Differences in Earnings Growth," NBER Working Papers 0667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, 2007. "Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time over Five Decades," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(3), pages 969-1006, 08.
  28. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz & Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. "The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap," NBER Working Papers 12139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysuis Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 704, Boston College Department of Economics.
  30. Claudia Olivetti & Stefania Albanesi, 2005. "Home Production, Market Production and the Gender Wage Gap: Incentives and Expectations," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-013, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  31. Christopher Dougherty, 2005. "Why Are the Returns to Schooling Higher for Women than for Men?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(4), pages 969-988.
  32. Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow & Eugene Choo, 2010. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," 2010 Meeting Papers 267, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  33. Susan Lewis & Valerie Oppenheimer, 2000. "Educational assortative mating across marriage markets: Nonhispanic whites in the United States," Demography, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 29-40, February.
  34. Pierre-André Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 37-74.
  35. repec:bla:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:2:p:507-535 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Gosling, Amanda, 2003. "The Changing Distribution of Male and Female Wages, 1978-2000: Can the Simple Skills Story be Rejected?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4045, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  37. Graciela Chichilnisky, 2008. "The Gender Gap," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 828-844, November.
  38. June E. O'Neill & Dave M. O'Neill, 2005. "What Do Wage Differentials Tell Us about Labor Market Discrimination?," NBER Working Papers 11240, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market (AER 2009) in ReplicationWiki

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2454. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.