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Love and taxes - and matching institutions

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  • Kai A. Konrad
  • Kjell Erik Lommerud

Abstract

Income disparities and the intra-family redistribution implied by a marriage may induce a high-income earner to abstain from marrying a low-income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally. Redistributive income taxation eases this problem, and the design of marriage matching institutions interacts with this role of redistributive taxation. Matching institutions that ensure that people largely from the same income groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution. Matching across income groups that focuses on emotional quality or preference congruence of the match may increase the efficiency-enhancing role of taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Kai A. Konrad & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 2010. "Love and taxes - and matching institutions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 919-940, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:43:y:2010:i:3:p:919-940
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01600.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Aloys Prinz, 2010. "Labor markets and mating markets: Using taxes to reduce the male–female pay gap," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 43-53, April.
    2. Kai Konrad, 2015. "Affection, speed dating and heartbreaking," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 159-172, January.
    3. Balestrino, Alessandro & Ciardi, Cinzia & Mammini, Claudio, 2013. "On the causes and consequences of divorce," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-9.
    4. Man Si, 2015. "Intrafamily bargaining and love," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 771-789, December.
    5. Dan Anderberg & Yu Zhu, 2010. "The Effect of Education on Marital Status and Partner Characteristics: Evidence from the UK," CESifo Working Paper Series 3104, CESifo.
    6. Dan Anderberg & Yu Zhu, 2014. "What a difference a term makes: the effect of educational attainment on marital outcomes in the UK," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 387-419, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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