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Over-education and assortative matching in partnerships: a theoretical analysis

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  • Alessandro Tampieri

Abstract

This paper argues that assortative matching may explain over-education. Education determines individuals’ income and, due to the presence of assortative matching, the quality of partners in personal, social and working life. Thus, an individual acquires education to improve the expected partners’ quality. However, since every individual of the same level of ability acquires the same level of education, the relative levels of education among individuals do not change, the expected partners’ quality does not increase and over-education emerges.

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  • Alessandro Tampieri, 2016. "Over-education and assortative matching in partnerships: a theoretical analysis," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 312-328, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:edecon:v:24:y:2016:i:3:p:312-328
    DOI: 10.1080/09645292.2015.1028898
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Tampieri, 2010. "Sex and the Uni: Higher Education Effects in Job and Marital Satisfaction," Discussion Papers in Economics 10/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Sep 2010.

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