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Personality Traits and the Marriage Market

  • Arnaud Dupuy

    (Reims Management School, Maastricht School of Management and IZA. Address: Reims Management School (RMS), 59, rue Pierre Taittinger - 51100 Reims, France. Email: arnaud.dupuy@reims-ms.fr.)

  • Alfred Galichon

    (Sciences Po Paris, Department of Economics, Address: 28 rue des Saint-Pères, 75007 Paris, France. E-mail: alfred.galichon@sciences-po.fr.)

Which and how many attributes are relevant for the sorting of agents in a matching market? This paper adresses these questions by constructing indices of mutual attractiveness that aggregate information about agents' attributes. The rst k indices for agents on each side of the market provide the best approximation of the matching surplus by a k-dimensional model. The methodology is applied on a unique Dutch households survey containing information about education, height, BMI, health, attitude towards risk and personality traits of spouses. Three important empirical conclusions are drawn. First, sorting in the marriage market is not unidimensional: individuals face important trade-o s between the attributes of their spouses which are not amenable to a singledimensional index. Second, although education explains a quarter of a couple's observable surplus, personality traits explain another 20%. Third, di erent personality traits matter di erently for men and for women.

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File URL: http://web2.msm.nl/RePEc/msm/wpaper/MSM-WP2012-41.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Paper provided by Maastricht School of Management in its series Working Papers with number 2012/41.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:msm:wpaper:2012/41
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  1. Federico Echenique & Sangmok Lee & Matthew Shum & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 153-171, 01.
  2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana-Domeque, 2011. "Matching with a Handicap: The Case of Smoking in the Marriage Market," Working Papers 2011-017, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
  3. Pierre Chiapore & Climent Quintana Domeque & Sonia Oreffice, 2010. "Fatter attraction: anthropometric and socieconomic matching on the marriage market," Working Papers. Serie AD 2010-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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  11. Oreffice, Sonia & Quintana-Domeque, Climent, 2010. "Anthropometry and socioeconomics among couples: Evidence in the United States," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 373-384, December.
  12. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2012. "Canonical Correlation and Assortative Matching: a remark," Working Papers 2012/40, Maastricht School of Management.
  13. Linda Y. Wong, 2003. "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(3), pages 699-728, July.
  14. Bernard Salanié & Alfred Galichon, 2011. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Discussion Papers 1011-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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  19. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Horta�su & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-63, March.
  20. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2010. "Matching with Trade-offs: Revealed Preferences over Competiting Characteristics," Working Papers hal-00473173, HAL.
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