IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jeclit/v54y2016i3p832-61.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Econometrics of Matching Models

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Bernard Salanié

Abstract

Many questions in economics can be fruitfully analyzed in the framework of matching models. Until recently, empirical work has lagged far behind theory in this area. This review reports on recent developments that have considerably expanded the range of matching models that can be taken to the data. A leading theme is that in such two-sided markets, knowing the observable characteristics of partners alone is not enough to credibly identify the relevant parameters. A combination of richer data and robust, theory-driven restrictions is required. We illustrate this on leading applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2016. "The Econometrics of Matching Models," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 832-861, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:54:y:2016:i:3:p:832-61
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20140917
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20140917
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=PUmpUUj3mhj2UC5tNhUev6OXxqb0BRZ7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2003. "A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 182-198, December.
    2. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
    3. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    4. Maristella Botticini & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Are There Increasing Returns in Marriage Markets?," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-050, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    5. Ivar Ekeland & James J. Heckman & Lars Nesheim, 2004. "Identification and Estimation of Hedonic Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages 60-109, February.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4kovgv3hs883bok2tvdkibejb6 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean‐Marc Robin, 2017. "Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1873-1919, November.
    8. Konrad Menzel, 2015. "Large Matching Markets as Two‐Sided Demand Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(3), pages 897-941, May.
    9. Dagsvik, John K, 2000. "Aggregation in Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 27-57, February.
    10. Pierre-André Chiappori & Robert McCann & Lars Nesheim, 2010. "Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(2), pages 317-354, February.
    11. Pierre-André Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana-Domeque, 2012. "Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(4), pages 659-695.
    12. Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2016. "Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production: A Longitudinal Microeconomic Analysis of Marriage, Intra-Household Bargaining and Time Use Using the BHPS, 1991-2008," Cahiers de recherche 1601, CIRPEE.
    13. Federico Echenique & Sangmok Lee & Matthew Shum & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 153-171, January.
    14. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié & Yoram Weiss, 2017. "Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2109-2167, August.
    15. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Reny, Philip J., 2016. "Matching to share risk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    16. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-163, March.
    17. Victor Chernozhukov & Alfred Galichon & Marc Henry & Brendan Pass, 2014. "Single Market Nonparametric Identification of Multi-Attribute Hedonic Equilibrium Models," Working Papers hal-01169655, HAL.
    18. Donald Boyd & Hamilton Lankford & Susanna Loeb & James Wyckoff, 2013. "Analyzing the Determinants of the Matching of Public School Teachers to Jobs: Disentangling the Preferences of Teachers and Employers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 83-117.
    19. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    20. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6486 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Abhijit Banerjee & Esther Duflo & Maitreesh Ghatak & Jeanne Lafortune, 2013. "Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 33-72, May.
    22. Victor Chernozhukov & Alfred Galichon & Marc Henry & Brendan, Department Of Mathematics Pass, 2014. "Single Market Nonparametric Identification of Multi-Attribute Hedonic Equilibrium Models," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/4kovgv3hs88, Sciences Po.
    23. Jeremy T. Fox & Patrick Bajari, 2013. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 100-146, February.
    24. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    25. James J. Heckman & Rosa L. Matzkin & Lars Nesheim, 2010. "Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Nonadditive Hedonic Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1569-1591, September.
    26. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 11-26, Part II, .
    27. Rosen, Sherwin, 1974. "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 34-55, Jan.-Feb..
    28. Dagsvik, John K, 1994. "Discrete and Continuous Choice, Max-Stable Processes, and Independence from Irrelevant Attributes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1179-1205, September.
    29. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 299-351, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    31. Decker, Colin & Lieb, Elliott H. & McCann, Robert J. & Stephens, Benjamin K., 2013. "Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 778-792.
    32. Konrad Menzel, 2016. "Inference for Games with Many Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 306-337.
    33. Horowitz, Joel L, 1992. "A Smoothed Maximum Score Estimator for the Binary Response Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 505-531, May.
    34. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    35. Ivar Ekeland, 2010. "Notes on optimal transportation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(2), pages 437-459, February.
    36. Manski, Charles F., 1975. "Maximum score estimation of the stochastic utility model of choice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 205-228, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sinha, Shruti, 2018. "Identification in One-to-One Matching Models with Nonparametric Unobservables," TSE Working Papers 18-897, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Salanié, Bernard, 2021. "Mating Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16041, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2021. "Mating Markets," Working Papers 2021-016, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    3. Jeremy T. Fox, 2018. "Estimating matching games with transfers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, March.
    4. Adda, Jérôme & Pinotti, Paolo & Tura, Giulia, 2020. "There's More to Marriage than Love: The Effect of Legal Status and Cultural Distance on Intermarriages and Separations," CEPR Discussion Papers 14432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460155, HAL.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9ur9159sab6hvkck is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1271-1319.
    8. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers 2106.02371, arXiv.org.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/361levbcs399s9oa154em6h9jl is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09mj4j5amb8 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," Papers 2109.07932, arXiv.org.
    12. Han, Seungjin & Yamaguchi, Shintaro, 2015. "Compensating wage differentials in stable job matching equilibrium," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 36-45.
    13. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Working Papers hal-03460155, HAL.
    14. Arnaud Dupuy, 2021. "Migration in China: To work or to wed?," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 393-415, June.
    15. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "A Theory of Marriage with Mutually Consented Divorces," Discussion Papers 16/14, Department of Economics, University of York.
    16. Jaerim Choi, 2021. "Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 473-509, September.
    17. Pierre-Andr'e Chiappori & Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "On Human Capital and Team Stability," Papers 2102.06487, arXiv.org.
    18. Raicho Bojilov & Alfred Galichon, 2021. "Matching in Closed-Form: Equilibrium, Identification, and Comparative Statics," Papers 2102.04295, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    19. Hector Chade & Jan Eeckhout & Lones Smith, 2017. "Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 493-544, June.
    20. Jacques Silber & Sasiwimon Warunsiri Paweenawat & Lusi Liao, 2022. "On the measurement of non-random mating and of its change over time," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 161-198, March.
    21. Odran Bonnet & Alfred Galichon & Yu-Wei Hsieh & Keith O'Hara & Matt Shum, 2021. "Yogurts Choose Consumers? Estimation of Random-Utility Models via Two-Sided Matching," Papers 2111.13744, arXiv.org.
    22. McCann, Robert J. & Shi, Xianwen & Siow, Aloysius & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2012. "Becker Meets Ricardo: Multisector Matching with Social and Cognitive Skills," IZA Discussion Papers 6533, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    23. Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2016. "Marriage, Labor Supply, and Home Production: A Longitudinal Microeconomic Analysis of Marriage, Intra-Household Bargaining and Time Use Using the BHPS, 1991-2008," Cahiers de recherche 1601, CIRPEE.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:54:y:2016:i:3:p:832-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.