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The Econometrics of Matching Models

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  • Pierre-André Chiappori
  • Bernard Salanié

Abstract

Many questions in economics can be fruitfully analyzed in the framework of matching models. Until recently, empirical work has lagged far behind theory in this area. This review reports on recent developments that have considerably expanded the range of matching models that can be taken to the data. A leading theme is that in such two-sided markets, knowing the observable characteristics of partners alone is not enough to credibly identify the relevant parameters. A combination of richer data and robust, theory-driven restrictions is required. We illustrate this on leading applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2016. "The Econometrics of Matching Models," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 832-861, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:54:y:2016:i:3:p:832-61
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.20140917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grossbard, Shoshana, 2016. "Marriage and Marriage Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 10312, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2018. "Pairwise stable matching in large economies," Working Papers 2018-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    3. Binder, Ariel J. & Lam, David, 2018. "Is There a Male Breadwinner Norm? The Hazards of Inferring Preferences from Marriage Market Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 11693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2018. "Pairwise stable matching in large economies," Graz Economics Papers 2018-01, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    5. Edoardo Rainone, 2017. "Pairwise trading in the money market during the European sovereign debt crisis," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1160, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. repec:eee:csdana:v:127:y:2018:i:c:p:135-159 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Ariel J. Binder & David Lam, 2018. "Is There a Male Breadwinner Norm? The Hazards of Inferring Preferences from Marriage Market Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 24907, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Jacob Schwartz, 2018. "Schooling Choice, Labour Market Matching, and Wages," Papers 1803.09020, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2018.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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