Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models
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- Bernard Salanié & Alfred Galichon, 2012. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5rkqqmvrn4t, Sciences Po.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Goussé, Marion & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Robin, Jean-Marc, 2017.
"Household labour supply and the marriage market in the UK, 1991-2008,"
Labour Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 131-149.
- Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2017. "Household Labour Supply and the Marriage Market in the UK, 1991-2008," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01507269, HAL.
- Marion Gousse & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2017. "Household labour supply and the marriage market in the UK, 1991-2008," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/660vg58v5k8, Sciences Po.
- Marion Goussé & Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2017. "Household Labour Supply and the Marriage Market in the UK, 1991-2008," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01476509, HAL.
- Pęski, Marcin, 2017. "Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 432-471.
- John K. Dagsvik & Zhiyang Jia, 2018. "Aggregate behavior in matching markets with flexible contracts and non-transferable representations of preferences," Discussion Papers 875, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
- repec:eee:jetheo:v:172:y:2017:i:c:p:202-219 is not listed on IDEAS
- Veronica Rappoport & Catherine Thomas & Bernard Salanie & Maria Guadalupe, 2013.
"The Perfect Match: Assortative Matching in International Acquisitions,"
2013 Meeting Papers
1000, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Veronica Rappoport & Catherine Thomas & Bernard Salanie & Maria Guadalupe, 2016. "The Perfect Match: Assortative Matching in International Acquisitions," 2016 Meeting Papers 507, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Aloysius Siow, 2015.
"Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
- Aloysius Siow, 2009. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Working Papers tecipa-356, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Jerez, Belén, 2016. "Competitive Search Equilibrium with Multidimensional Heterogeneity and Two-Sided Ex-ante Investments," UC3M Working papers. Economics 23566, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Seul-Ki Shin, 2014. "Preferences vs. Opportunities: Racial/Ethnic Intermarriage in the United States," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-040, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Pierre-Andr'e Chiappori & Robert McCann & Brendan Pass, 2016. "Multidimensional matching," Papers 1604.05771, arXiv.org.
More about this item
Keywords
matching; marriage; assignment; hedonic prices;JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
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