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The Nonatomic Assignment Model

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Listed:
  • Gretsky, Neil E
  • Ostroy, Joseph M
  • Zame, William R

Abstract

We formulate a model with a continuum of individuals to be assigned to a continuum of different positions which is an extension of the finite housing market version due to Shapley and Shubik. We show that optimal solutions to such a model exist and have properties similar to those established for finite models, namely, an equivalence among the following: (1) optimal solutions to the linear programming problem (and its dual) associated with the assignment model; (2) the core of the associated market game; and (3) the Walrasian equilibria of the associated market economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 103-127, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:1:p:103-27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gerard Debreu, 1963. "On a Theorem of Scarf," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 30(3), pages 177-180.
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