Matching Networks with Bilateral Contracts
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to- many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not exhibit a supply chain structure, stable allocations need not exist. By contrast, in the presence of supply chain structure, a natural substitutability condition characterizes the maximal domain of firm preferences for which stable allocations always exist. Furthermore, the classical lattice structure, rural hospitals theorem, and one-sided strategy-proofness results all generalize to this setting.
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- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006.
"A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets,"
Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2004. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Game Theory and Information 0401002, EconWPA.
- Federico Echenique & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000374, David K. Levine.
- Jorge Oviedo & Federico Echenique, 2005. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," 2005 Meeting Papers 233, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2003. "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 1185, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Pathak, Parag Abishek & Roth, Alvin E., 2009.
"Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,"
11077572, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-78, December.
- Konishi, Hideo & Unver, M. Utku, 2006.
"Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 57-80, July.
- Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Credible Group-Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 570, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 19 Jan 2005.
- Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Ünver, 2003. "Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems," Game Theory and Information 0309005, EconWPA, revised 06 Sep 2003.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-27, March.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004.
"Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples,"
117, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico, 2009. "Supermodularity and preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1004-1014, May.
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